

## Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century

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By “the public sphere” we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body. They then behave neither like business nor professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy.

Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about matters of general interest. In a large public body this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. Today newspapers and magazines, radio and TV are the media of the public sphere. We speak of the political public sphere in contrast, for instance, to the literary one, when public discussion deals with objects connected to the activity of the state. Although state activity is so to speak the executor, it is not a part of it. . . . Only when the exercise of political control is effectively subordinated to the democratic demand that information be accessible to the public, does the political public sphere win an institutionalized influence over the government through the instrument of law-making bodies.<sup>1</sup>

IN THIS summary statement Habermas reveals perhaps better than in the book itself how far his conception of the public sphere amounts to an ideal of critical liberalism which remains historically unattained. History provides only distorted realizations, both at the inception of the public sphere (when the participant public was effectively limited to the bourgeoisie) and with the later transformations (which removed this “bourgeois ideal” of informed and rational communication still further from any general or universal implementation). *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* rests on an immanent critique, in which Habermas confronts the liberal ideal of the reasoning public with the reality of its own particularism and long-term disempowerment. From a vantage point in the late 1950s the main direction of Habermas’s perspective was, not surprisingly, pessimistic—“etching an unforgettable portrait of a degraded public life, in which the substance of liberal democracy is voided in a combination of plebiscitary manipulation and privatized apathy, as any collectivity of citizenry disintegrates.”<sup>2</sup> But the book was not just a story of decay. It remains a careful exploration of a particular historical moment, in which certain possibilities for human emancipation were unlocked—possibilities which for Habermas were ordered around the “central idea of communicatively generated rationality,” which then became the leitmotif of his own life’s work.<sup>3</sup>

In a nutshell, the public sphere means “a sphere which mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion.” Historically, its growth occurred in the later eighteenth century with the widening of political participation and the crystalizing of citizenship ideals. It eventuated from the struggle against absolutism (or in the British case, from the struggle for a strengthening of constitutional monarchy), and aimed at transforming arbitrary authority into rational authority, subject to the scrutiny of a citizenry organized into a public body under the law. It was identified most obviously with the demand for representative government and a liberal constitution, and more broadly with the basic civil freedoms before the law (speech, press, assembly, association, no arrest without trial, and so on). But Habermas was less interested in this more familiar process of overt political change. More fundamentally, the public sphere presumed the prior transformation of social relations, their condensation into new institutional arrangements, and the generation of new social, cultural, and political discourse around this changing environment. Conscious and programmatic *political* impulses emerged most strongly where such underlying processes were reshaping the overall context of social communication. The public sphere presupposed this larger accumulation of sociocultural change. It was linked to the growth of urban culture—metropolitan and provincial—as the novel arena of a locally organized public life (meeting houses, concert halls, theaters, opera houses, lecture halls, museums), to a new infrastructure of social communication (the press, publishing companies, and other literary media; the rise of a reading public via reading and language societies; subscription

publishing and lending libraries; improved transportation; and adapted centers of sociability like coffeehouses, taverns, and clubs), and to a new universe of voluntary association.

In other words, the public sphere derives only partly from the conscious demands of reformers and their articulation into government. Indeed, the latter were as much an effect of its emergence as a cause. Socially, the public sphere was the manifest consequence of a much deeper and long-term process of societal transformation—that Habermas locates between the late Middle Ages and the eighteenth century as a trade-driven transition from feudalism to capitalism in which the capital accumulation resulting from long-distance commerce plays the key role and for which the mercantilist policies of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the midwife. The category of the public was the unintended consequence of long-run socioeconomic change—eventually precipitated by the aspirations of a successful and self-conscious bourgeoisie, whose economic functions and social standing implied a cumulative agenda of desirable innovation. Habermas postulates a causal homology of culture and economics in this sense, growing from “*the traffic in commodities and news* created by early capitalist long-distance trade” (p. 15). On the one hand, commercialization undermined the old basis of the household economy, reoriented productive activity “toward a commodity market that had expanded under public direction and supervision,” and reconstituted state/society relations on the basis of a new distinction between the private and the public; on the other hand, the flow of international news attendant on the growth of trading networks generated a new category of public knowledge and information, particularly in the context of the seventeenth-century wars and intensified competition among “nations” in the mercantilist sense, which led to a new medium of formal exchange and the invention of the press. This model of change, in which both new cultural possibilities and new political forms appear as the excrescence of an accumulating structural transformation, might be applied to a range of phenomena normally associated with industrialization or the developmental process. Thus in very general terms, the nineteenth-century growth of local government owed much to improvised grappling with the problems of an urbanizing society (poverty, policing, amenities like lighting and sewage, commercial licensing, revenue creation, and so on), to the extent of the local state’s being actually *constituted* by the practical associational initiatives of a new citizenry in the making—but as the unintended, rolling effect of structurally invited interventions, as opposed to the strategic result of a coherent design.

Ultimately, though, Habermas is less interested in the realized political dimension of the public sphere—that is, the particular political histories of the late eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries—than in abstracting a strong ideal against which later forms of the public sphere can be set. His own vantage point—as the legatee of the Frankfurt School, who resumed their critique of mass culture at the height of the Christian Democratic state and the postwar boom, at a low ebb of socialist and democratic prospects—is crucial

to an understanding of the book's motivating problematic. Habermas affirmed the critique of the present (the consciousness industry, the commodification of culture, the manipulation and manipulability of the masses), while he specifically retrieved the past (the Enlightenment as the founding moment of modernity). By contrast with Horkheimer and Adorno, he upheld the Enlightenment's progressive tradition. Thus his model of the public sphere has an avowedly double function: as Hohendahl says, "It provides a paradigm for analyzing historical change, while also serving as a normative category for political critique."<sup>4</sup> Arguably, it is the latter that really drives the analysis. Moreover, while the public sphere argument is clearly crucial to politics in the full democratic sense (as the enlargement of human emancipation), its main thrust is anterior to politics of the parliamentary or institutional kind. For Habermas, the parliamentary stands of a Fox were less important than the larger context of rational and unrestricted discourse from which they had grown and which they could presuppose. The faculty of "publicness" begins with reading, thought, and discussion, with reasonable exchange among equals, and it is this ideal that really focuses Habermas's interest. It resided in the act of discussion and the process of exchange:

The truly free market is that of cultural discourse itself, within, of course, certain normative regulations; . . . What is said derives its legitimacy neither from itself as message nor from the social title of the utterer, but from its conformity as a statement with a certain paradigm of reason inscribed in the very event of saying.<sup>5</sup>

It is perhaps unclear how far Habermas believes his ideal of rational communication, with its concomitant of free and equal participation, to have been actually realized in the classical liberal model of *Öffentlichkeit*. Sometimes he acknowledges the class and property-bound basis of participation, but not to the extent of compromising his basic historical claim. However, the model also postulates a "structural transformation of the public sphere," and as suggested above, the narrowing of the ideal's possibilities over the longer run forms the main starting point of the book. Particularly from the last third of the nineteenth century, the growing contradictions of a capitalist society—the passage of competitive into monopoly or organized capitalism, the regulation of social conflicts by the state, and the fragmentation of the rational public into an arena of competing interests—serve to erode the independence of public opinion and undermine the legitimacy of its institutions. In the cultural sphere proper, from the arts to the press and the mass entertainment industry, the processes of commercialization and rationalization have increasingly targeted the individual consumer while eliminating the mediating contexts of reception and rational discussion, particularly in the new age of the electronic mass media. In this way the classic basis of the public sphere—a clear distinction between public good and private interest, the principled demarcation of state and society, and the constitutive role of a participant citizenry, defining public policy and its parameters through reasoned exchange, free of dom-

ination—disappears. The relations between state and society are reordered, to the advantage of the former and the detriment of a “free” political life.

Now, the strengths and weaknesses of Habermas’s work on the public sphere have been much discussed (though mainly in the German-speaking rather than the English-speaking world, it should be said), not least in the papers and sessions of the present conference that precede my own.<sup>6</sup> A certain amount of overlap is inevitable, and I certainly would not want to discuss the historical dimensions of the argument in isolation from its theoretical value. But I want to confine myself to a series of comments which confront Habermas’s work with a corpus of intervening historical writing (not all of it by historians), which sometimes confirms, sometimes extends, and sometimes undermines his argument. These concern (1) a wide variety of literatures that confirm the usefulness of the core concept of the public sphere, (2) the question of gender and the implications of women’s history and feminist theory, (3) the state and politics in the strict sense, and (4) the problem of popular culture.

#### THE FINDINGS OF SOCIAL HISTORY

The value of the Habermasian perspective has been fundamentally borne out by recent social history in a variety of fields. On rereading the book (after originally discovering it in my own case in the early 1970s and then systematically engaging with it in the later part of that decade) it is striking to see how securely and imaginatively the argument is historically grounded, given the thinness of the literature available at the time. In this respect I am very struck by the affinity with the work of Raymond Williams, on whose argument in *Culture and Society, 1780–1950* (London, 1958) Habermas draws extensively in the early part of the book. The form of the argumentation is very similar to that of Williams (e.g., the whole introductory discussion culminating in the treatment of the shift in the meanings of the terms for “public” in English, German, and French between the late seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries—pp. 1–26). The very method—of moving from the “world of letters” to the structure of society—is characteristic of Williams’s project in his early work. The later stage of Habermas’s argument about the public sphere’s transformation and degeneration (e.g., Ch. 18: “From a Culture-Debating Public to a Culture-Consuming Public,” or Ch. 20: “From the Journalism of Private Men of Letters to the Public Consumer Services of the Mass Media”) anticipates the broad historical argument of *The Long Revolution* (London, 1961), and *Communications* (Harmondsworth, 1962), in which Williams developed his ideas about the long-term decline in the forms and degree of popular access and control in the area of culture. On the other hand, Williams’s subsequent work on mass media has always maintained a strong affirmative stance on the democratic potentials of new communications technologies (see especially his *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* [Lon-

don, 1974], or the chapter on “Culture and Technology” in *The Year 2000* [New York, 1983], pp. 128–52), and his view of film, radio, TV, popular fiction, popular music, and so on is far removed from the Frankfurt School’s critique of mass culture and popular taste via the notion of commodity fetishism—a critique that it is unclear whether, and how far, Habermas himself would share. Incidentally, rather remarkably there is no entry for “public” in Williams’s *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (London, 1976; revised and expanded ed., 1983).<sup>7</sup>

Moving from Habermas’s general approach and mode of argument to areas of research that fall concretely or empirically within the public sphere framework, I wish to mention a number of examples, which certainly don’t exhaust the contexts in which Habermas’s idea could be embodied, but which are those most familiar to me. These are as follows:

- A large amount of eighteenth-century British social history, mainly associated with the influence of J. H. Plumb, but also including a range of urban history, which effectively fills in the framework Habermas proposed without (so far as I know) being explicitly aware of it.<sup>8</sup>
- A similar literature on popular liberalism in Britain, concentrated in the period of Gladstone between the 1860s and 1890s, but with some anticipation earlier in the nineteenth century in the politics and moral campaigning of provincial religious Dissent.<sup>9</sup>
- A less plentiful literature on the social context of liberalism in Germany, running from the social history of the Enlightenment to the period of unification in the 1860s.<sup>10</sup>
- A disparate literature on political socialization and political mobilization in peasant societies, partly in social history, partly in sociology, and to a lesser extent in anthropology. The breaking down of parochial identities and the entry of rural societies into national political cultures—or the nationalization of the peasantry, as it might be called—is in one dimension the creation of local public spheres and their articulation with a national cultural and political arena. The literature on rural politics and peasant mobilization in nineteenth-century France is especially interesting from this point of view.<sup>11</sup>
- An equally disparate literature in the sociology of communications, focused on the history of the press and other media, the rise of a reading public, popular literacy, and mass communications. As already mentioned above, the work of Raymond Williams is especially central here, together with a considerable body of work in British cultural studies, much of it filtered through the British reception of Gramsci. But another fundamental point of departure is the classic work of Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966; orig. ed. 1954), which has been most imaginatively taken up by the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch for a systematic analysis of the emergence of nationalities in the nineteenth century. In practice, in large parts of southern and eastern Europe in the later nineteenth century (and in the extra-European colonial world in the twen-

tieth century) the emergence of nationality (i.e., the growth of a public for nationalist discourse) was simultaneously the emergence of a public sphere. This codetermination makes a large body of literature on nationalism relevant to the historical discussion of Habermas's idea.<sup>12</sup>

What all of these literatures have in common is a focus on voluntary association and associational life as the main medium for the definition of public commitments. If we take one of the above arguments about the public sphere's conditions of existence seriously—that it presumed the prior transformation of social relations and took clearest shape where the overall context of social communication was being institutionally reformed—there are good grounds for taking voluntary association as a main indicator of social progress in Habermas's sense. In fact, Habermas treats this subject himself to some extent by noting the importance of reading and literary societies to the new public aspirations. But the confluence of these older eighteenth-century associations (reading societies, patriotic clubs, political discussion circles, freemasonry, other secret societies) with more specific political ambitions during the era of the French Revolution, and with the desire for social prestige on the part of the emergent bourgeoisie, also produced a more visible push for social leadership and domination. Thus throughout Germany in the early decades of the nineteenth century the urban and small-town bourgeoisie crystalized their nascent claims to social primacy by forming themselves into an exclusive social club, usually called something like Harmony, Concordia, Ressource, or Union. A club of this kind was the matrix for the formation of a local elite. It acquired its own buildings, recruited only the most prestigious pillars of local society (who might number some thirty businessmen, merchants, lawyers, doctors, and civil servants in a local population of some 6,000 at the start of the century), admitted new members only by careful election, offered a wide range of social facilities (including the reading room), and organized balls, concerts, banquets, and lectures. It was the obvious center of political discussion, and generated a variety of philanthropic, charitable, and recreational activities in the community at large. Thus in Heilbronn in southwest Germany, the Harmony had its own building with club rooms, reading rooms, library, and a surrounding park called the Shareholders' Garden. It was the center of a fine web of informally organized activity radiating into the local social scene. Indeed, the visible performance of civic duties was vital to a notable's moral authority in the town, whether by sitting on charitable or philanthropic committees, improving public amenities, patronizing the arts, promoting education, organizing public festivals, or commemorating great events.<sup>13</sup>

Such associational initiatives were fundamental to the formation of a bourgeois civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) in nineteenth-century Germany, in ways that are intimated and assumed in Habermas's text, but which perhaps lack the necessary concrete elaboration for the nineteenth century. Put simply, voluntary association was in principle the logical form of bourgeois

emancipation and bourgeois self-affirmation. This was true in three strong ways. First, the ideal and practice of association were explicitly hostile, by both organization and intent, to older principles of corporate organization, which ascribed social place by hereditary and legal estate. By contrast, the new principle of association offered an alternative means of expressing opinion and forming taste, which defined an independent *public* space beyond the legal prescriptions of status and behavior of the monarchical and/or absolutist state. It is central to Habermas's conception of the public sphere in this sense. Second, sociologically, associationism reflected the growing strength and density of the social, personal, and family ties among the educated and propertied bourgeoisie (*Bildung und Besitz*). It described a public arena where the dominance of the bourgeoisie would naturally run. It was the constitutive organizational form of a new force for cultural and political change, namely, the natural social power and self-consciously civilized values of a bourgeoisie starting to see itself as a general or universal class. Third, voluntary association was the primary context of expression for bourgeois aspirations to the general leadership of nineteenth-century society. It provided the theatrical scaffolding for the nineteenth-century bourgeois drama. In this context the underlying principles of bourgeois life—economic, social, moral—were publicly acted out and consciously institutionalized into a model for the other classes, particularly the petty bourgeoisie and the working class, who became the objects of philanthropic support and cultural edification.<sup>14</sup>

Now, the treatment of this theme in nineteenth-century German historiography is rather truncated, mainly because the liberal ideal of emancipation (to which the arguments from voluntary association and the public sphere are hitched) is usually thought to have been decisively blocked by the 1860s and 1870s: if liberalism in Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany was such a broken reed, historians see little point in studying the emancipatory purposes of local associational life. If the main story was of decline and degeneration (of liberalism and the public sphere), then the value of looking at the associational arena tends to fall.<sup>15</sup> We can find stronger coverage of such matters, therefore, in a national historiography where the unity of the bourgeoisie's social progress and liberal political success has remained intact in historians' understanding, namely, that of Britain.

For many years J. H. Plumb's *The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675–1725* (London, 1967) was one of the few texts keeping open a broader and more developed approach to eighteenth-century British politics, as opposed to the narrow interest-based conception of high politics that had come to dominate the field in general. In the intervening two decades Plumb himself published a series of essays that carried this further and explored the cultural changes that allowed something like a free political life to begin to take shape. Though the shadow of a theory barely darkens his pages, Plumb's contributions fall interestingly within the framework Habermas lays out, concerning things like the growth of a reading public, the commercialization of leisure, expanding educational provision, the transition from private to public



entertainment, and the general spread of such trends from the capital to the provinces. In effect, this amounted to the gradual coherence of a self-conscious middle-class public, which wore its provincialism less as an embarrassment than as an expression of buoyant creativity.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, Plumb has inspired a wider body of work, for which John Brewer's study of politics in the 1760s is a splendid example. While Brewer tackles the structure of politics in general, his most important chapters concern the impact of extraparliamentary activity on the parliamentary arena. His chapter on the press covers the entire institutional fabric of public debate in the 1760s, including the nature of literacy, media of publication (newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, squibs, handbills, songs), the complexities of literary production (as in the seasonality and varied media of circulation), the discrepancies between circulation and actual readership, the role of "bridging" ("the transmission of printed information in traditional oral forms," as in ballads), the social universe of coffeehouse and club, and the spread of postal and turnpike communications. He adds an analysis of the ritual and symbolic content of crowd behavior during the Wilkite manifestations that deepens George Rudé's classic treatment and tells us much about the nascent forms of a new popular politics. When combined with the substantive treatments of mid-century radicalism and its transformations (particularly via the impact of the American radicals), these discussions present "an alternative structure of politics," which in the conjunctures of the 1780s and 1790s had major democratic and oppositional implications. How far the "alternative structure" coincided, organizationally, sociologically, and ideologically, with the emergence of the public sphere described by Habermas is a moot question (which I will return to in the section "Popular Culture and the Public Sphere"). But for present purposes, we may simply note the detailed embodiment of a novel notion of the "public."<sup>17</sup>

John Money's study of the West Midlands, likewise influenced by Plumb, makes a related contribution. Money is concerned with the transition from a rural to a mainly urban-industrial society and with the cultural adaptations that managed to contain much of the potential for social conflict in the new manufacturing center of Birmingham. He suggests that Birmingham's social, economic, and political integration within the wider county community of Warwick was strengthened rather than fractured by the experience of urban growth, and between the 1760s and 1790s this cultural resilience allowed a new sense of regional identity to form. This claim is explored through careful analyses of the local notables—Birmingham merchants and manufacturers—who both kept their links with the county landowners via projects like the Birmingham General Hospital and societies like the Bean Club and the masonic lodges, and defined a separate identity vis-à-vis London and the other regions. Naturally, the process of regional development was not without tensions, and Money devotes much space to the unfolding of religious and other ideological disagreements, and to the emergence of a more popular radicalism. But in the end neither the hostilities of Anglicanism and Dissent nor the

pressure for reform nor the promise of Jacobinism were strong enough to tear the fabric of regional community.<sup>18</sup>

More than anything else, Money's book is a study of regional political culture. With Brewer, he shares an intimate knowledge of the structure of public discourse in the chosen period—not just the press, but the public spectacle of music and the stage, the associational milieu of “taverns, coffee-houses and clubs,” and the literary world of “printing, publishing and popular instruction”—what Money calls “the means of communication and the creation of opinion.” It becomes clear from this kind of analysis that the origins of an independent political life—i.e., a public sphere in Habermas's sense—must be sought in this wider domain of cultural activity, from which a self-confident middle class began to emerge. The foundations were laid before Brewer's and Money's period between the 1680s and 1760s in what has been called an “English urban renaissance,” when the growth of towns; new patterns of personal consumption; expanding demand for services, professions, and luxury trades; and the commercialization of leisure all combined to stimulate a new culture of organized recreation, public display, improved amenities, and urban aesthetics.<sup>19</sup> But the political consequences of this process could flourish only in the later part of the eighteenth century, with the commercialization that produced “the birth of a consumer society” and the growing differentiation and self-consciousness of “the middling sort or bourgeoisie” (the “men of moveable property, members of professions, tradesmen and shopkeepers,” who comprised some “million of the nation's nearly seven million” inhabitants and who strove for independent space between the “client economy” of the aristocracy and the real dependence of the laboring poor).<sup>20</sup>

Money shows how this flourishing could happen in very practical ways. First, the extension of formal culture to the provinces presupposed public places in which performances and concerts could be held. Hence the phenomenon of the assembly room built by private subscription, where the social elite could meet for balls, music, lectures, and theater, what Plumb calls a “transitional stage between private and fully public entertainment.”<sup>21</sup> Such assemblies were sustained by associational action, which in Birmingham extended from the freemasons and other secret circles, to an elite formation like the Bean Club, or equally exclusive intellectual groups like the Lunar Society and reading societies. From this crystalized a wider sense of cultural and political identity, for which the building of the Birmingham General Hospital between 1765 and 1779 by private subscription was the archetypal case. The Hospital's triennial music festivals established themselves as major occasions for the gathering of the West Midlands' leading families, playing a key part in attracting patronage and realizing the town's cultural ambitions.<sup>22</sup> Second, new networks of communication seem especially important, not just because the press and a reading public ease the exchange of information and ideas, but in the larger sense of providing a new institutional context for political action. Money stresses the canal building of the last third of the century,

which had an enormous effect in solidifying the new regional and eventually national identities. The floating of a canal scheme entailed an entire repertoire of political initiatives (the creation of new regional political networks, deliberate cultivation of public opinion, participation within the national parliamentary institutions, widespread lobbying of the affected private and public interests), which eventually culminated in the call for a more rational public authority to expedite the whole unwieldy process. This last was key, for to avoid the duplication of projects and an anarchy of particularistic interests, there developed an urgent need to rationalize the activity, and this was increasingly done by reference to some larger "national interest." As Money says, such conflicts became best handled by an appeal to Parliament "as mediator between the public interest on the one hand and private property and enterprise on the other."<sup>23</sup> In the related area of road building such resolution was achieved by inventing the institution of the turnpike trust. As a third case I cite the abortive General Chamber of Manufacturers of Great Britain, formed between 1785 and 1787 as a short-lived response to some of the government's fiscal measures. Though indifferently successful outside the West Midlands and Manchester, this further solidified regional networks and simultaneously oriented them toward national institutions, both existing (Parliament) and notional (a national market).

Now, illustrative analysis of this kind, which puts Habermas's idea to work, can be easily duplicated, because the formation of political culture in this sense has been a fundamental dimension of the capitalist developmental process (except, one should immediately say, where the latter has been imposed from above or without by authoritarian vanguards in situations of extreme societal "backwardness"). But how are we to judge Habermas's idea in its light? The basic point is clear enough, namely, the relationship of the new liberal values of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to definite developmental processes of class formation and social growth (the transition from feudalism to capitalism, as Habermas describes it, with the concomitant rise of the bourgeoisie). For Brewer no less than for Habermas, a particular ideological structure or cultural formation (liberalism, the ideal of emancipation grounded in rational communication, the Enlightenment discourse of freedom) is the complex effect of a socioeconomic developmental process (the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the rise of capitalism, commercialization, the birth of a consumer society), mediated via the novel institutional structures of the public sphere.<sup>24</sup> At one level Habermas shows how the genesis of the liberal tradition can be grounded in a particular social history, and analyses such as Brewer's or Money's are an excellent concretizing of that project.

On the other hand, what are the problems? Basically, Habermas confines his discussion too much to the bourgeoisie. In his preface Habermas does specifically limit himself to "the *liberal* model of the bourgeois public sphere" (p. xviii) on the grounds of its dominance, distinguishing it from both "the plebeian public sphere" associated with the Jacobin phase of the French

Revolution, which later manifested itself in Chartism and the anarchist strains of the continental labor movement, and “the plebiscitary-acclamatory form of regimented public sphere characterizing dictatorships in highly developed industrial societies” (by which he presumably means fascism). The reference to these alternative forms is too cryptic to allow any sensible speculation about what Habermas means in detail, but he does describe the plebeian version as being “suppressed in the historical process” and in any case “oriented toward the intentions of the bourgeois public sphere” (and therefore a dependent variant). I will be returning to this point again below. But here I want to stress the *variable* origins of *Öffentlichkeit*. The virtue of “publicness” could materialize other than by the intellectual transactions of a polite and literate bourgeois milieu. Despite the best efforts of the latter precisely to appropriate such a function to itself and to establish exclusive claims on the practice of reason, “private people putting reason to use” (Habermas, p. xviii) could also be found elsewhere. In this respect we can make three important points:

1. The liberal desideratum of reasoned exchange also became available for nonbourgeois subaltern groups, whether the radical intelligentsia of Jacobinism and its successors or wide sections of social classes like the peasantry or the working class. Whether in literary (the production and circulation/diffusion of ideas) or political terms (the adoption of constitutions and liberties under the law), the global ideological climate encouraged peasant and working-class voices to strive for the same emancipatory language. That is, the positive values of the liberal public sphere quickly acquired broader democratic resonance, with the resulting emergence of impressive popular movements, each with its own distinctive movement cultures (i.e., form of public sphere). It’s open to question how far these were simply derivative of the liberal model (as Habermas argues) and how far they possessed their own dynamics of emergence and peculiar forms of internal life. There is enough evidence from the literature on Owenism, Chartism, and British popular politics and on the forms of political sociability in the French countryside to take this argument seriously.<sup>25</sup> Some recent writing has stressed Chartism’s confinement in an inherited political framework and its indebtedness to a given language of political opposition, it is true.<sup>26</sup> But we can see such a movement as in one sense “a child of the eighteenth century” (Habermas, p. xviii), and therefore bound by a dominant model, and at the same time acknowledge its historical specificity and autonomous forms of expression. In particular, Habermas’s oppositions of “educated/uneducated” and “literate/illiterate” simply don’t work, because (as we shall see) the liberal public sphere was faced at the very moment of its appearance by not only a “plebeian” public that was disabled and easily suppressed, but also a radical one that was combative and highly literate.

2. Because of the international impact of the French Revolution, the liberal political ideal encapsulated by the concept of the public sphere was made available in many parts of Europe way ahead of the long-run social transformations, which in western Europe form the starting point of Habermas’s argument. All

over east-central and southern Europe, and frequently representing little more than themselves, small groups of intellectuals responded to the French Revolution and its legacy by lodging their own claims to nationhood. The French experience bequeathed a political vocabulary in which such new aspirations could be engaged, a structured ideological discourse of rights and self-government into which such emergent intelligentsias might naturally insert themselves. The encounter with revolutionary France induced conscious reflection not only on the circumstances of political dependence in which such societies invariably found themselves, but also on the associated handicaps of socioeconomic backwardness. Indeed, the radical departures of the French Revolution not only gave sympathetic intellectuals in more “backward” societies a new political language for articulating their own aspirations, it also allowed them to conceptualize their situations as “backwardness” to begin with. It interpellated them in that sense via the new forms of nationalist political address. Armed with the new political consciousness, they then set about constituting a national public sphere in all the ways discussed above—from literary societies, subscription networks, the press, and a national reading public, to the gymnastic and sharpshooter clubs, and the popular reading rooms that carried the activity into the countryside—but with the crucial differences: it was stimulated from the outside rather than being the spontaneous outgrowth of indigenous social development, in response to backwardness rather than progress; and it was consciously expansive rather than narrowly restrictive, oriented toward proselytizing among the people rather than closing ranks against them.<sup>27</sup>

3. It is important to acknowledge the existence of *competing* publics, not just later in the nineteenth century, when Habermas presents the fragmentation of the classical liberal model of *Öffentlichkeit*, but at every stage in the history of the public sphere, and, indeed, from the very beginning. I’ve argued immediately above in (1) and (2) that emancipatory activity meeting Habermas’s criteria could originate in ways that seem not to be encompassed in his classical model (in popular peasant and working-class movements, and in nationalist activity). His conception is needlessly restrictive in other ways too. He *both* idealizes its bourgeois character (by neglecting the ways in which its elitism blocked and consciously repressed possibilities of broader participation/emancipation) *and* ignores alternative sources of an emancipatory impulse in popular radical traditions (such as the dissenting traditions studied by Edward Thompson and Christopher Hill).<sup>28</sup> By subsuming all possibilities into his “liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere,” Habermas misses this diversity. More to the point, he misses the extent to which the public sphere was always constituted by conflict. The emergence of a bourgeois public was never defined solely by the struggle against absolutism and traditional authority, but necessarily addressed the problem of popular containment as well. The classic model was already being subverted at the point of its formation, as the actions of subordinate classes threatened to redefine the meaning and extent of the “citizenry.” And who is to say that the discourse of the London Corresponding Society was any less “rational” than that of, say, the Birmingham Lunar Society (let alone the Birmingham Bean

Club)? Consequently, the “public sphere” makes more sense as the structured setting where cultural and ideological contest or negotiation among a variety of publics takes place, rather than as the spontaneous and class-specific achievement of the bourgeoisie in some sufficient sense. I will return to this point again below.

#### GENDER AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

So far I have considered Habermas’s idea mainly in its own terms, by elaborating on what I take to be his conception of bourgeois culture and seeing how the latter might be concretized by using bodies of recent work in social history; and I have begun to indicate some of the ways in which his limitation of the public sphere model to the bourgeoisie starts to become problematic in this light. In fact, Habermas’s idea works best as the organizing category of a specifically liberal view of the transition to the modern world and of the ideal bases on which political and intellectual life should be conducted. But his model of how reason in this sense is attained—of a “subjectivity originating in the interiority of the conjugal family” (p. 51), becoming conscious first of itself and then of a wider domain of communicative human relations, traveling into a larger associational arena (book clubs, reading societies, salons, etc.) of literary-intellectual exchange and rational-critical debate, and then replicating itself in a political public sphere of property owners—is an extremely idealized abstraction from the political cultures that actually took shape at the end of the eighteenth and start of the nineteenth century. At one level this is a familiar historian’s complaint: “reality” was more “complicated” than that (and too complicated for *any* theory to be adequate, it is often implied); and indeed, the kind of associational initiatives discussed above were certainly subject to a messier set of particular causalities than Habermas appears to allow, at least for the purposes of his immediate theorization. But this is not just a matter of “the facts” and getting them straight. The formation of Birmingham’s later eighteenth century associational networks, or the creation of an elite club in early-nineteenth-century German small towns, or the creation of literary societies in mid-nineteenth century Bohemia all involved questions of *interest*, *prestige*, and *power*, as well as those of rational communication. The public sphere in its classical liberal/bourgeois guise was partial and narrowly based in that sense, and was constituted from a field of conflict, contested meanings, and exclusion.

The most consistent of these exclusions—preceding and outlasting, for instance, the calling into question of the public sphere’s boundaries on the criterion of class—is based on gender. Nancy Fraser has done an excellent job of facing Habermas’s basic categories of social analysis—the systematically integrated domains of the economy and state, and the socially integrated domains of the lifeworld (namely, the private sphere of the family and the public sphere of citizenship), where each constitutes a distinct action context (of

functionally driven transactions secured via the media of money and power; and of value-driven interactions focused on intersubjective consensus), corresponding to processes of material and symbolic reproduction, respectively—with the “gender subtext” that runs continuously through these separations. As she says, in Habermas’s theory the economic and state systems are simultaneously “disengaged or detached from the lifeworld” and then “related to and embedded in it”; the systems have to be situated “*within* the lifeworld . . . in a context of everyday meanings and norms,” and for this purpose the lifeworld “gets differentiated into two spheres that provide appropriate complementary environments for the two systems”—namely, “the ‘private sphere’ or modern, restricted, nuclear family . . . linked to the (official) economic system” via the medium of monetary exchange; and “the ‘public sphere’ or space of political participation, debate, and opinion formation . . . linked to the state-administrative system” via the exchange medium of power. To cut a long and extremely careful critique short, Fraser concludes that the addition of the gender perspective cuts through the structure of distinctions Habermas maintains:

Once the gender-blindness of Habermas’s model is overcome, however, all these connections come into view. It then becomes clear that feminine and masculine gender identity run like pink and blue threads through the areas of paid work, state administration and citizenship as well as through the domain of familial and sexual relations. This is to say that gender identity is lived out in all arenas of life. It is one (if not the) “medium of exchange” among all of them, a basic element of the social glue that binds them to one another.<sup>29</sup>

I want to take this basic feminist critique as understood, and confine myself to a few general observations about the directions of some recent historical work. First, an accumulating tradition of feminist critique has shown how far modern political thought is highly gendered in its basic structures, particularly in the context of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, when the key elements of liberal and democratic discourse were originally formed. Thus the constitutive moment of modern political understanding was itself constituted by newly conceived or rearranged assumptions about woman and man: this was not only registered in the practical achievements of constitutions, legal codes, and political mobilization and their forms of justification, but also ordered the higher philosophical discourse around the universals of reason, law, and nature, grounding it in an ideologically constructed system of differences in gender. The elaboration of this system was complex, and need not concern us in detail here. Without questioning the continuity of women’s oppression in earlier periods and societies, there is a strong case for seeing the form of women’s exclusion from political participation and civil rights as the historically specific consequence of processes that worked themselves out in the context of the French Revolution. The new category of the “public man” and his “virtue” was constructed via a series of oppositions to “femininity,” which both mobilized older conceptions of domesticity and

women's place and rationalized them into a formal claim concerning women's "nature." At the most fundamental level, particular constructions of "womanness" defined the quality of being a "man," so that the *natural* identification of sexuality and desire with the feminine allowed the *social* and *political* construction of masculinity. In the rhetoric of the 1780s and 1790s reason was counterposed conventionally to "femininity, if by the latter we mean (as contemporaries did) pleasure, play, eroticism, artifice, style, politesse, refined facades, and particularity."<sup>30</sup> Given this mannered frivolity, women were to be silenced to allow masculine speech—in the language of reason—full rein.

Thus the absence of women from the political realm "has not been a chance occurrence, nor merely a symptom of the regrettable persistence of archaic patriarchies," but a specific product of the French Revolutionary era. In addition to the other radical departures of that time, modern politics was also constituted "as a relation of gender."<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the very breakthrough to new systems of constitutional legality—in which social relations were reordered by conceptions of right, citizenship, and property, and by new definitions of the public and the private—necessarily forced the issue of woman's place, because the codification of participation allowed—indeed, required—conceptions of gender difference to be brought into play. As Landes says, this occurred via "a specific, highly gendered bourgeois male discourse that depended on women's domesticity and the silencing of 'public' women, of the aristocratic and popular classes"; and "the collapse of the older patriarchy gave way to a more pervasive *gendering* of the public sphere."<sup>32</sup> This obviously has major implications for Habermas's argument. He is certainly not unaware of the exclusion of women from the nineteenth-century politics or of the patriarchal nature of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century family (see, e.g., pp. 43–56, 132). But these matters are assimilated to his general notion of the widening discrepancy between ideal and reality in the nineteenth-century history of the public sphere, and the major ambiguity at the center of Habermas's thinking (the abstraction of an ideal of communicative rationality from historical appearances that were always already imperfect in its terms) lessens the force of the recognition. In fact, the critique of women's subordination can proceed at two levels. On the one hand, there is the synthetic attack on patriarchy as a continuous figure of European political thought from Hobbes through Locke to the Enlightenment and beyond. Women are essentially confined within the household. "Within this sphere, women's functions of child-bearing, child-rearing and maintaining the household are deemed to correspond to their unreason, disorderliness and 'closeness' to nature. Women and the domestic sphere are viewed as inferior to the male-dominated 'public' world of civil society and its culture, property, social power, reason and freedom."<sup>33</sup> But on the other hand, the beauty of Landes's analysis is to have shown how this pattern of subordination was reformulated and recharged in the midst of the major political cataclysm—the



French Revolution—through which the ideal of human emancipation was otherwise radically enlarged. In other words, Habermas's model of rational communication was not just vitiated by persisting patriarchal structures of an older sort; the very inception of the public sphere was itself shaped by a new exclusionary ideology directed at women. As Carol Pateman puts it:

In a world presented as conventional, contractual and universal, women's civil position is ascriptive, defined by the natural particularity of being women; patriarchal subordination is socially and legally upheld throughout civil life, in production and citizenship as well as in the family. Thus to explore the subjection of women is also to explore the fraternity of men.<sup>34</sup>

Second, the story of associational activity may also be retold in gendered terms—i.e., by highlighting the exclusionary treatment of women, not just as an additive retrieval of a previously neglected aspect, but as an insight that fundamentally reconstructs our sense of the whole. Again, simply invoking traditional patriarchal structures to explain the exclusion of women from politics is perhaps too easy: as Catherine Hall says, middle-class *men* had not been involved in the English political process before the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and given the general radicalism of the road that led to 1832, the marginalization of middle-class women from this process—i.e., why the attack on traditional values stopped short of patriarchy—needs some specific explanation.<sup>35</sup> In supplying the latter, Davidoff and Hall have stressed *both* the constitutive importance of gender (i.e., the historically specific structuring of sexual difference) in the ordering of the middle-class social world (via particular structures of family and domesticity, and particular styles of consumption) *and* the reciprocal interactions between this private sphere and the public sphere of associational life and politics, in which the latter both reflected and actively reproduced the gendered distinctions of class identity generated between home and work.<sup>36</sup> At a time of enormous socio-economic and political disorder (from the 1790s to the 1840s), “middle-class farmers, manufacturers, merchants and professionals . . . , critical of many aspects of aristocratic privilege and power, sought to translate their increasing economic weight into a moral and cultural authority . . . not only within their own communities and boundaries, but in relation to other classes”; and they did so via the same associational trajectory (from informal family/friendship/religious/business networks, through clubs and coffeehouses, to public voluntary associations of a philanthropic-cum-charitable, scientific/cultural/educational, business/professional/property-related, and political-campaigning kind), which I have argued carried Habermas's public sphere concretely into existence. But—and this is the point to note here—this activity strictly demarcated the roles of men and women via a mobile repertoire of ideologies and practices, which consistently assigned women to a nonpolitical private sphere, “having at most a supportive role to play in the rapidly expanding political world of their fathers, husbands and brothers.”<sup>37</sup> Davidoff

and Hall present this gendering of the public sphere in a remarkable richness of detail. It is salutary to substitute their summary description for the characterization of the associational context of the public sphere unfolded above:

Middle-class men's claims for new forms of manliness found one of their most powerful expressions in formal associations. The informal, convivial culture of eighteenth-century merchants, traders and farmers was gradually superseded by the age of societies. Men organized themselves in myriad ways, promoting their economic interests, providing soup kitchens for the poor, cultivating the arts, reaching into populated urban areas and rural outposts. This network of association redefined civil society, creating new arenas of social power and constructing a formidable base for middle-class men. Their societies provided opportunities for the public demonstration of middle-class weight and responsibility; the newspaper reports of their events, the public rituals and ceremonials designed for their occasions, the new forms of public architecture linked to their causes. The experience of such associations increased the confidence of middle-class men and contributed to their claims for political power, as heads of households, representing their wives, children, servants and other dependents. This public world was consistently organized in gendered ways and had little space for women. Indeed, middle-class women in the second half of the nineteenth century focused many of their efforts on attempting to conquer the bastions of this public world, a world which had been created by the fathers and grandfathers.<sup>38</sup>

Third, this separation of spheres—between the masculine realm of public activity and the feminine realm of the home, which certainly didn't preclude (and was finely articulated with) relations of interconnectedness between business/occupation and household, and engendered a particular conception of the public and the private for the emergent nineteenth-century middle class<sup>39</sup>—was replicated in the situation of the working class. In most of the early democratic movements of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, with the significant exception of the followers of Owen, Fourier, and some other utopian socialists, popular sovereignty was basically a male preserve. Chartism in Britain, as the strongest and most impressive of these movements, is a good example, because the famous Six Points for the democratization of the constitution drawn up in 1837–1838 expressly excluded votes for women. While individual Chartists raised the issue intermittently thereafter, the enduring consensus (shared by the movement's women no less than the men) was that female suffrage deserved a low priority. This was even clearer elsewhere in movements of peasants, shopkeepers, and artisans, where democratic aspirations were practically linked to the economics of small-scale household production and to a sexual division of labor in which women had a significant but subordinate place. By the end of the nineteenth century European socialist parties had certainly put women's political rights into their programs. But it's worth recalling how little female suffrage had actually progressed before 1914, with women enjoying the vote only in parts of the North American West and just four of today's parliamentary states—

New Zealand (1893), Australia (1903), Finland (1906), and Norway (1913)—interestingly all of them frontier states in one way or another.

The reasons for such entrenched discrimination were naturally complex, but ultimately had to do with ideas about the “naturalness” of woman’s place and the proper social ordering of sexual difference. Women had no autonomous political standing in the prevailing theories of government and representation. As Sally Alexander says: “The legal, economic and political subject in radical popular speech reaching back to the seventeenth-century Levellers, was the propertied individual, and the propertied individual was always masculine—whether head of household, skilled tradesman or artisan whose property was his labor.” Inscribed in the political language of radical democracy were definite notions of masculinity and femininity organized around a clear distinction between the *public world* and a *domestic-cum-communal sphere*, where patriarchal “notions of labor, property and kin” structured—and limited—“women’s access to acknowledge, skill and independent political subjectivity.” Women were highly active in Chartism and other radical agitations of the early nineteenth century. But when they spoke, they did so within the walls of the embattled popular community itself. It fell to men to speak to the outside world “in the first person for the community as a whole.” *Public* discourse in the full sense, involving the whole field of popular socioeconomic discontents, campaigns for civil freedoms, struggles over the law, and the demand for the vote, was closed to women. It was conducted as “a dialogue of negotiation between the men of the communities and the ruling class—‘capitalists and lawgivers.’”<sup>40</sup>

For the various groups of radical working men—“the small master craftsmen, the displaced domestic worker, the artisan and mechanic, the skilled factory operatives,” who provided the backbone of Chartism and the related movements—the integrity of the household was constitutive for political identity; and whatever complementarities and reciprocities there may have been between men and women in the household division of labor, as a system of domestic authority the family was centered on masculine privilege. Thus in voicing their anger against the advance of capitalist industry, which undermined their skills and pulled their wives and children into the factory, radical artisans were also defending their own sexual and economic regime in the family. In their minds “their status as fathers and heads of families was indelibly associated with their independence through ‘honorable’ labor and property in skill, which identification with a trade gave them.” Women, by contrast, had no access to such independence. In their own right they were excluded from most trades and could practice a craft only by virtue of their male kin. Usually, they “assisted” the latter. Her “skill” was in the household, her “property in the virtue of her person.” But “separated from the home, her family and domestic occupations, or outside the bonds of matrimony, a woman was assured of neither.” Logically enough, a woman’s political identity was subsumed in that of the man, and it was no accident that the rare proponents of female suffrage among the Chartists also limited their advo-

cacy to “spinsters and widows,” because wives and husbands were simply deemed to be one.<sup>41</sup>

This thinking was easily adapted to the changed circumstances of industrialization. The manner of the adjustment was already signaled by the calls for “protective” laws that became especially clamorous in the 1830s and 1840s: demanding the protection of women and children against the degrading and brutalizing effects of work in the new mills, they also reflected the desire for an idealized notion of family, hearth, and home, where benign patriarchy and healthy parental authority ordered the household economy by the “natural differences and capacities” of women and men. When wives and children were forced into the factory by the unemployment or depressed earning power of the husband-father, this natural order was upset. To this dissolution of moral roles—the “unsexing of the man,” in Engels’ phrase—were then added the effects of women’s cheap labor, whose increasing utilization by the new capitalists spelled a loss of jobs, status, and skill for the skilled man. Whatever the real basis of these fears, this fusion of economic and ideological anxieties—resistance to the capitalist reorganization of industry, and the desire to quarantine the family’s moral regime—proved a potent combination for those categories of skilled workers strong enough actually to secure a strong bargaining position for themselves.<sup>42</sup> In the new prosperity and greater political stability in British society after 1850, such groups of workers were able to come into their own.

The result was a recharged domestic ideology of masculine privilege, whose realistic attainment was now confined to those groups of skilled workmen able to support a wife and children on the strength of their own earning power alone. The nature of the labor market for most men—involving the irregularity, casualness, and seasonality of most unskilled and much skilled employment, with the connected difficulties of low, irregular wages and weak organization—ensured that male earnings had to be supplemented by whatever income the wife and the rest of the family could produce, usually in casual, sweated, or home-based employment or in the locally based informal economy. Measured by the rest of the working class, therefore, the position of the skilled craftsman able to keep his wife in domesticated nonemployment was becoming an extremely privileged one—not just in relation to women, but in relation to the mass of unskilled males too. Trade unionism before the 1890s was virtually predicated on this system of exclusion, and the new ideal of the “family wage” was a principal mechanism separating the small elite of trade-unionized craftsmen from the mass of ordinary workers. But not only did it strengthen the material advantages enjoyed by the craft elite. It also postulated a normative definition of women’s employment as something exceptional and undesirable, and delivered ideological justifications for “keeping women in their place”—or, at least, for not according their interests the same priority as male workers’ in trade union terms—that proved persuasive far outside the ranks of the labor aristocrats themselves and became a pervasive feature of working-class attitudes towards women’s political status. Thus

it was a paradox of socialist politics before 1914 that parties which were in many ways the staunchest advocates of women's rights in the political arena had also originated in the activism of skilled workers who practiced the worst systems of craft exclusiveness against women—both in immediate terms and in terms of the larger social discrimination/subordination they implied. As we know from the scholarship of the last two decades, the socialist tradition's official supportiveness for women's rights usually concealed a practical indifference to giving them genuine priority in the movement's agitation. More basically, such political neglect was linked to attitudes and practices deeply embedded in the material conditions of working-class everyday life, at work, in the neighborhood, and at home. Behind the labor movement's neglect of women's issues were historically transmitted patterns of masculinist behavior and belief which trade unionists and left-wing politicians were consistently unwilling to challenge.<sup>43</sup>

I can best express the relevance of this to the discussion of the public sphere by considering the relationship of the private and the public. The specification of a public sphere necessarily implies the existence of another sphere that's private, and by contrast with what Habermas sometimes implies, as Fraser has argued, the boundaries between these two domains are not fast but permeable. The discussion here is also complicated by the recent revival of theorizing around "civil society": as John Keane reminds us, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the state/civil society couplet was operated by political theorists in a rich variety of ways; we might add that such diversity is compounded by the difficulties of distinguishing the autonomies of the private realm in these traditions (e.g., where does the economic belong in this three-way schema of state/civil society/private sphere; how far is morality the vector of an interventionism that transcends all three; how do we deal with subjectivity?); and it is by no means clear how Habermas's theory of the public sphere fits with this older tradition of thought.<sup>44</sup> But allowing for this diversity of meanings, it may be useful to remind ourselves in a simplified way of the varying definition the public realm may be given. Is this a purely "political" matter in the narrower sense of government and public administration, for instance, or should the legitimate reach of political intervention extend to other more "private" spheres like the economy, recreation, the family, sexuality, and interpersonal relations? Broadly speaking, there have been probably three main answers within the classical left-wing tradition:

- A *pure democratic* one, stressing the political rights of democracy and based in a clear separation of the public from the private sphere, in which the constitution guarantees strong rights of autonomy to the latter through civil freedoms, freedom of conscience and religion, property rights, rights of privacy, and so on
- A *socialist* one, in which the public sphere of democracy becomes extended to the economy through nationalization, the growth of the public sector, trade unionism, the welfare state and other forms of socialized public provision

in the areas of health care, social insurance, education, recreation, and so on

- A *utopian* one, in which democracy becomes radically extended to social relations as a whole, including large areas of personal life, domestic living arrangements, and child raising, usually in the form of some kind of communitarianism

In the period since 1968 we may add a fourth version of this relationship between the public and the private, which subjects each of the above to searching critique, and that is the *feminist* one. Aside from facing the earlier versions with the need to address the interests/aspirations of women as well as men, the feminist version brings the principle of democracy to the center of the private sphere in a qualitatively different way. It systematically politicizes the personal dimension of social relations in a way that transforms the public/private distinction—in terms of family, sexuality, self, and subjectivity. Obviously, contemporary feminism is not without its antecedents. Thus the utopian socialists of the 1830s and 1840s had politicized the personal sphere in ways that seem strikingly radical when set against the staid preoccupations of the later nineteenth-century socialist tradition. Strong notions of women's reproductive rights and liberated sexuality could also be found on the margins of the left between the 1880s and 1914, and more extensively in the cultural radicalism of 1917–1923. But it is only really in the last third of the twentieth century that the gendered characteristics of the classical public sphere have been properly opened to critique—by elaborating theories of sexuality and subjectivity, identifying ideologies of motherhood, confronting the sexual division of labor in households, and developing a critique of the family as such. As Pateman says:

The meaning of “civil society” . . . has been constructed through the exclusion of women and all that we symbolize. . . . To create a properly democratic society, which includes women as full citizens, it is necessary to deconstruct and reassemble our understanding of the body politic. This task extends from the dismantling of the patriarchal separation of private and public, to a transformation of our individuality and sexual identities as feminine and masculine beings. These identities now stand opposed, part of the multifaceted expression of the patriarchal dichotomy between reason and desire. The most profound and complex problem for political theory and practice is how the two bodies of humankind and feminine and masculine individuality can be fully incorporated into political life. How can the present of patriarchal domination, opposition and duality be transformed into a future of autonomous, democratic differentiation?<sup>45</sup>

#### STATE FORMATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Despite the richness—empirically and imaginatively—of Habermas's account of the formation of (West) European political culture in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there is little discussion of the state per se or of

specific political histories, at least in the senses we've become familiar with during the last two decades, whether via the state-theoretical literatures generated/provoked by Marxists in the 1970s or in the more heterogeneous work on state formation, which was already under way when Habermas conceived his book in the 1950s and early 1960s (most obviously associated with the influence of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the U.S. Social Science Research Council set up in 1954). At the same time, while this omission is significant (in that it has a necessary bearing on how the overall problematic of modern political development is constructed/implicit in Habermas's text), Habermas's purpose was different and legitimately specific, concerned, as we have seen, with the "free space" of society rather than a state-centered approach to public authority or political development. He also has lots to say with relevance to the latter, particularly in his extensive and very interesting discussions of the law. Moreover, if we consider the major contributions to the historical discussion of comparative political development produced since the late 1960s (most of them by nonhistorians in the professional sense, incidentally), they have remarkably little to say to the questions of the public sphere and political culture formation raised by Habermas. These works include the writings of Barrington Moore, Jr., and Charles Tilly, both of whom pioneered the turn by U.S. sociology to history in this area; Immanuel Wallerstein's studies of the "modern world-system," Perry Anderson's of absolutism, and Theda Skocpol's of "states and social revolutions"; and the more recent and differently accented projects of Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann. Wallerstein is only secondarily concerned with political, as opposed to economic, history; Anderson deals with state and society relations, but for an earlier period and at a level of generality that makes it hard to engage with Habermas's questions (the latter will in any case be more pertinent to the next installment of Anderson's project, namely, the comparative analysis of bourgeois revolutions); Skocpol focuses rather stolidly on the state in the narrower sense, as a central nexus of government institutions. Tilly's work on collective action and state formation brings us closer to political culture, but deals with "the extractive and repressive activities of states" rather than the cultural and ideological ones. Barrington Moore poses the problem of comparative political development through the gross interactions of social forces ("lord and peasant in the making of the modern world"), and has little directly to say about the structure of states, the shaping of a public sphere, or the contribution of urban classes. Neither Mann nor Giddens has anything to say about the public sphere in the sense discussed by this paper; the former's forthcoming second volume may well treat this theme directly, but the latter's discussion of "Class, Sovereignty and Citizenship" is bizarrely perfunctory and deals with the subject under an entirely "administrative" perspective.<sup>46</sup> Each of these otherwise extremely interesting works pays little attention to political culture, to the wider impact of the state in society and the modalities of popular consent and opposition, or to the social processes from which political activity ultimately derived. From this point of view, Habermas's translation of the discussion onto a sociocultural terrain, particularly

for its time, represents a welcome shift of perspective and might well have found greater resonance in the literature on state formation than it has.

As a view of political development, though, Habermas's framework has a number of drawbacks, some of which have already been mentioned. For one thing, by using a model of communicative rationality to mark the rise of liberalism and the constitutionalizing of arbitrary authority, and by stressing the transition to a more interventionist state under advanced capitalism, he strongly implies a *weak* state during the classical public sphere's period of initial formation. But it is unclear how the boundaries between state and society are to be drawn from Habermas's analysis of this period. Was the liberal state really so uninterested in regulating the private sphere or so noninterventionist in the resolution of social and political conflict? Habermas is very good on the legal reforms necessary to promote and ratify the changing bases of property, and as Karl Polanyi always insisted, the road to laissez-faire was paved in state intervention. The same was true of sociocultural and political, no less than of economic freedoms: to deregulate society, and confirm a protected space for the public, an entire regulative program was required.<sup>47</sup> Secondly, and in a similar vein, Habermas's argument idealizes the element of rational discourse in the formation of the public sphere, and neglects the extent to which its institutions were founded on sectionalism, exclusiveness, and repression. In eighteenth-century Britain parliamentary liberty and the rule of law were inseparable from the attack on customary rights, popular liberties, and nascent radical democracy, as Edward Thompson's work has so eloquently reminded us.<sup>48</sup> As I suggested above, the participants in the bourgeois public always faced two ways in this sense—forward in confrontation with the old aristocratic and royal authorities, but also backward against the popular/plebeian elements already in pursuit. We can't grasp the ambiguities of the liberal departure—the consolidation of the classical public sphere in the period, say, between 1760 and 1850—without acknowledging the fragility of the liberal commitments and the element of contestation in this sense. It's only by extending Habermas's idea in this direction—toward the *wider* public domain, where authority is not only constituted as rational and legitimate, but where its terms may also be contested and modified (and occasionally overthrown) by society's subaltern groups—that we can accommodate the complexity.

For this purpose, I want to suggest, an additional concept may be introduced, namely, Antonio Gramsci's idea of "hegemony." Some basic awareness of this is now fairly extensive, but, while there is now no shortage of careful critical exegesis around Gramsci's own intentions, the wider usage can be ill-informed and glib, and it is important to clarify the purposes the idea is meant to serve. It is worth beginning with Gwyn A. Williams's useful definition, which was also the form in which most of us first encountered the concept before the more extensive translation and discussion of Gramsci's thought in the 1970s: hegemony signifies "an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused



throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation.”<sup>49</sup> Now, this is fine as far as it goes, but it can also license a number of misconceptions, so several points need to be made in elaboration. First, “hegemony” should not be used interchangeably with “ideology” or “ideological domination” *tout court* in a perspective stressing the “manipulations” or “social control” deliberately exercised by a ruling class. As Raymond Williams says in the course of a brilliant exposition: hegemony comprises “not only the conscious system of ideas and beliefs [i.e., ‘ideology’ in a commonly accepted sense] but the whole lived social process as practically organized by specific dominant meanings and values,” “a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.” Hegemony should be seen

as in effect a saturation of the whole process of living—not only of political or economic activity, nor only of manifest social activity, but of the whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense. Hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of “ideology,” nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as “manipulation” or “indoctrination.” It is the whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our senses and assignments of energy, or shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world.<sup>50</sup>

This sense of completeness and externally structured experience, of “the wholeness of the process” by which a given social order holds together and acquires its legitimacy, is the most obvious feature of Gramsci’s idea.<sup>51</sup>

Second, however, Gramsci’s idea of hegemony was not a “totalitarian” concept (contrary to some of the older commentaries of the 1950s and 1960s, such as H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* [New York, 1958], pp. 96–104). In fact, he used it carefully to distinguish elements of pluralism and competition, of persuasion and consent, from the more repressive and coercive forms of rule and the conventional process of governing in the administrative sense. Though he takes careful note of direct interventions by the state against society to suppress opposition, to contain dissent, and to manipulate educational, religious, and other ideological apparatuses for the production of popular compliance, therefore, Gramsci expressly links hegemony to a domain of public life (which he calls “civil society,” but which might also be called the “public sphere”) that is relatively independent of such controls, and hence makes its achievement a far more contingent process. To establish its supremacy, in Gramsci’s view, a dominant class must not only *impose* its rule via the state, it must also demonstrate its claims to “intellectual and moral leadership,” and this requires the arts of persuasion, a continuous labor of

creative ideological intervention. The capacity “to articulate different visions of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is neutralized,” rather than simply suppressing those visions beneath “a uniform conception of the world,” is the essence of hegemony in Gramsci’s sense.<sup>52</sup> But by the same virtue, hegemony is also susceptible to change and negotiation—not just because it involves the pursuit of consent under conditions of pluralism (however limited), but also because this process nonetheless operates through social relations of dominance and subordination structured by class inequality, and therefore involves contradictory and opposing interests.

Third, therefore, hegemony is characterized by uncertainty, impermanence, and contradiction. As I put it with Keith Nield on an earlier occasion, hegemony “is not a fixed and immutable *condition*, more or less permanent until totally displaced by determined revolutionary action, but is an institutionally negotiable *process* in which the social and political forces of contest, breakdown and transformation are constantly in play.”<sup>53</sup> In this sense, hegemony is always in the process of construction, because bringing the process to closure would entail either a utopia of social harmony or the replacement of hegemonic by coercive rule. Hegemony is always open to modification, and under specific circumstances may be more radically transformed or even (though not very often) break down altogether. Thus civil society provides opportunities for *contesting* as well as *securing* the legitimacy of the system. More than anything else, then, hegemony has “to be won, secured, constantly defended.” It requires “a struggle to win over the dominated classes in which any ‘resolution’ involves both *limits* (compromises) and *systematic contradictions*.”<sup>54</sup> The dominance of a given social group has to be continually renegotiated in accordance with the fluctuating economic, cultural, and political strengths of the subordinate classes.

Gramsci’s distinction between “hegemonic” and “coercive” forms of rule is also operated historically. That is, developed capitalist polities whose legitimacy rests on a fairly stable “equilibrium of hegemonic and coercive institutions” are directly contrasted with an older type of state that lacks this vital reciprocity with civil society:

In the ancient and medieval state alike, centralization, whether political-territorial or social . . . was minimal. The state was, in a certain sense, a mechanical bloc of social groups. . . . The modern state substitutes for the mechanical bloc of social groups their subordination to the active hegemony of the directive and dominant group, hence abolishes certain autonomies, which nevertheless are reborn in other forms, as parties, trade unions, cultural associations.<sup>55</sup>

The passage from one type of state to another presupposes processes of social change that allow new political ambitions to be crystallized. For Gramsci, the latter consist of three moments: the growth of corporate solidarities; their organization into a larger class collectivity; and their translation onto the highest political plane of “universal” interest. With the development of the last of these aspirations, the process of hegemonic construction may be said to have

begun, with the growth of a new “national-popular” dimension to public life, and a new claim to “intellectual and moral leadership” in the society as a whole. It is in the context of such a history that the institutional landscape of civil society gradually takes shape. In a now famous and much-quoted passage, Gramsci hinted at the comparative possibilities of this approach:

In Russia the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks.<sup>56</sup>

For Gramsci, this contrast was specifically a way of explaining the success of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution, which simultaneously illustrated the fundamentally different strategy required of the Left in Western Europe, where the greater complexity of the social fabric, the liberal traditions of citizenship and constitutionalism, and the functioning pluralism of the political system meant that power was diffused more intangibly through a wide variety of nonofficial practices and organizations, as opposed to being physically embodied in a central core of state institutions in the capital city: if in Russia the backwardness of civil society left the state an isolated citadel, which could then be stormed, in the West the structures of existing society were far more complex, requiring a long-term war of position on the part of a revolutionary opposition, and not the insurrectionary war of movement. For our purposes, nineteenth-century Russia provides an excellent counterexample for the growth of the public sphere. It displayed the absence of all those processes—particularly the emancipatory impulse of free associational initiative, which under Tsarism was precluded by a combination of social backwardness and repressive state authority—which Habermas’s concept of *Öffentlichkeit* presupposed.

#### POPULAR CULTURE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Of course, for Gramsci civil society was not quite the neutral context for the emergence of rational political discourse in the ideal and abstract sense intended by Habermas. As I have argued, it was an arena of contested meanings, in which different—and opposing—publics maneuvered for space, and from which certain “publics” (women, subordinate nationalities, popular classes like the urban poor, the working class, and the peasantry) may have been excluded altogether. Moreover, this element of contest was not just a matter of coexistence, in which such alternative publics participated in a tolerant pluralism of tendencies and groupings; such competition also occurred in class-divided societies structured by inequality, and consequently questions of domination and subordination—power, in its economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions—were also involved. That being so,

hegemony—as the harnessing of public life to the interests of one particular group, i.e., a social bloc ordered around the dominant classes—had to be systematically worked at, whether consciously and programmatically (as in the early stages of such a process of hegemonic construction) or increasingly as the “natural” and unreflected administration or reproduction of a given way of doing things. *Intellectuals* in Gramsci’s schema—as a broadened social category, including journalists, party officials, teachers, priests, lawyers, technicians, and other professionals, as well as writers, professors, and intellectuals in the narrower conventional sense—were the functionaries of this process.

I want to explore this element of conflict—the fractured and contested character of the public sphere—by looking again at the latter’s constitutive moment as Habermas presents it in the later eighteenth century in Britain and I want to do so by drawing on the extremely interesting work of Gunther Lottes, who (by contrast with most of the Anglo-American work on the subject) is familiar with Habermas’s framework and, indeed, uses it to develop his argument.<sup>57</sup> Lottes’s book is a reworking of a key part of Edward Thompson’s *Making of the English Working Class* and revolves around a careful analysis of the emergence of a radical intelligentsia and its relationship to a plebeian public in later-eighteenth-century England, conducted in two stages. During the first, in the 1770s and 1780s, radical intellectuals postulated a regeneration of the constitution through popular education and parliamentary reform. The corruption and besetting factionalism of the governing system were to be challenged by an extraparliamentary campaign of public enlightenment. At this stage, Lottes argues, the links between intelligentsia and public were external rather than organic, asserted at the level of principle and propaganda, but not yet consummated through new forms of communication or structures of popular participation. Moreover, this earlier intelligentsia was recruited from the upper reaches of society, from three overlapping groups of notables (*Honoratioren*): landowners, merchants, and other prosperous businessmen, whose intellectual pursuits presumed (though not complacently) the material security of their social position; representatives of the academic professions, mainly lawyers and Nonconformist clergy; and the literati and writers in the narrower sense, newly constituted as a separate profession by the emergent literary marketplace. Their activity was loosely structured around London’s coffeehouse society, in the discussion circles and debating clubs typified by the Robin Hood Society, the Speculative Society, or the Debating Society in Coachmakers’ Hall. If anything, the provincial counterparts were more ramified and vital, certainly in the major centers of Manchester and Birmingham. At the political apex was the Society for Constitutional Information, founded in 1780, which remained the principal forum of the radical intelligentsia until the launching of the London Corresponding Society (LCS) in 1792. Thus far, it may be thought, Lottes’s account fits very nicely into Habermas’s framework, and adds further to the

illustrative materials provided by Brewer, Money, and others discussed earlier. But the subsequent unfolding of his argument is more subversive.

At one level, the reform movement of the 1780s, which was expressly committed to the creation of an extraparliamentary public, broke the existing frame of legitimate politics. By seeking to educate the general populace into citizenship, the pre-Jacobin radicals raised the issue of universal manhood suffrage and broke “with the previously uncontested dogma of political theory that property alone justified a claim to political participation.”<sup>58</sup> Yet at the same time, the Society for Constitutional Information made no attempt at direct popular mobilization. This, the open agitation of the masses within a new practice of participatory democracy, occurred only with the *second* of Lottes’s two stages, that of the English Jacobinism proper. As the organizing instance of the new activity, the LCS then had two distinguishing features. By comparison with the earlier radicals its leadership was drawn more broadly from the less prestigious and established circles of the intelligentsia—not only recognized intellectuals like the merchant’s son Maurice Margot, the Unitarian minister Jeremiah Joyce, or the lawyers Felix Vaughan, John Frost, and John Martin, but also “not yet arrived or declassed marginal existences of the London literary-publicistic scene” like John Gale Jones, Joseph Gerrald, William Hodgson, the Binns brothers (John and Benjamin), or John Thelwall (“the prototype of the literatus from a modest background who tried vainly for years to find a foothold in the London artistic and literary scene”), the numerous small publishers and book dealers, and the “first representatives of an artisan intelligentsia” like the shoemaker Thomas Hardy, the silversmith John Baxter, the hatter Richard Hodgson, or the tailor Francis Place.<sup>59</sup> Then second, this new Jacobin intelligentsia set out deliberately to mobilize the masses, by carrying the work of political education into the turbulent reaches of the plebeian culture itself.

Thus the key to the LCS’s originality was its relationship to the ebullient but essentially prepolitical culture of the urban masses, what Lottes calls “the socio-cultural and institutional context of the politicization of the petty and sub-bourgeois strata.”<sup>60</sup> In adopting the democratic principle of “members unlimited,” the LCS committed itself not only to a program of popular participation, but also to a “confrontation with the traditional plebeian culture,” of which it was certainly no uncritical admirer. As Lottes says, “The Jacobin ideal of the independent, well-informed and disciplined citizen arriving at decisions via enlightened and free discussion stood in crass contradiction with the forms of communication and political action characteristic of the plebeian culture.”<sup>61</sup> In other words, riot, revelry, and rough music were to be replaced by the political modalities of the pamphlet, committee room, resolution, and petition, supplemented where necessary by the disciplined democracy of an orderly open-air demonstration. The most valuable parts of Lottes’s account are those exploring the practicalities of this departure—in the meticulous constitutionalism of the LCS, in the creation of an atmosphere for

rational political discussion, in the radicals' critique of the "mob," and in the details of their "enlightenment praxis." A new "plebeian public sphere" (*plebejische Öffentlichkeit*) emerged from these endeavors, nourished on the intense political didacticism of the LCS sections, a rich diet of pamphlets, tracts, and political magazines, and the theatrical pedagogy of Thelwall's Political Lectures. Unlike the radicals of the 1780s, the Jacobins entered into a *direct* relationship with their putative public, and unlike conventional parliamentarians, they did so in a nonmanipulative and nondemagogic way.

This was the real significance of the popular radicalism of the 1790s in Britain. It was more than a mere stage in the long-term movement toward parliamentary reform between the 1760s and 1832, and more than a mere epiphenomenon of the deeper trend toward extraparliamentary "association." It was also more than the founding moment of the nineteenth-century labor movement (which was how it was mainly presented in the older labor history and allied accounts). It was a specific attempt—defined by the global context of the "Atlantic Revolution," the national dynamics of the movement for parliamentary reform, the complex sociology of the English intelligentsia, and the political economy of the London and provincial handicrafts—to educate the masses into citizenship. It should be viewed as "partly the achievement and partly the continuing expression of a comprehensive effort at enlightenment and education, aimed at bringing the urban stratum of small tradesmen and artisans to the point where they could articulate their social and political discontent no longer in the pre-political protest rituals of the traditional plebeian culture, but instead in a political movement with firm organization, a middle and long-term strategy, and a theoretically grounded program."<sup>62</sup> As such, it was as much the "end product of the bourgeois enlightenment of the eighteenth century" as it was the herald of the nineteenth-century working-class movement. As Albert Goodwin, another historian of the English Jacobinism, puts it, the tradesmen, shopkeepers, and mechanics addressed by the LCS were to be educated into political knowledge not just to ensure "their more effective participation in politics," but "to rid society of the turbulence and disorder which was then often inseparable from the ventilation of popular grievances."<sup>63</sup>

At the same time, there were definite limits to the English Jacobins' possible achievement. For one thing the advanced democracy of the LCS *presumed* the very maturity and sophistication it was meant to *create*. The goals of political pedagogy were hard to reconcile with the competing demands of effective organization, creative leadership, and maximum participation of the members—what Lottes calls "the triangular tension of organizational effectiveness, fundamental democratic consciousness at the grass roots, and educational mission"<sup>64</sup>—particularly when government repression was stepped up after 1793. Moreover, tactically it was hard to confront the "backwardness" of the popular culture too intransigently without beginning to compromise the resonance of the radical propaganda and undermining the movement's basic democratic legitimacy. The Jacobins were also confined in a

different direction by the tenacity of the dominant eighteenth-century oppositionist ideology—a potent combination of “Country” ideology and natural rights thinking—which stressed the degeneration of an originally healthy constitution and raised serious obstacles to the adoption of Tom Paine’s more radical break with the English constitutional tradition. In this respect, the Jacobin radicals remained dependent on the intellectual legacy of the 1780s, and most of their distinctive achievements (e.g., Thelwall’s social as opposed to his political theory) were well within the limits of this earlier tradition.<sup>65</sup>

Lottes’s account nicely brings together the points I’ve been trying to make (although it should be said straight away that his discussion remains as gender blind as Habermas’s own). On the one hand, the actual pursuit of communicative rationality via the modalities of the public sphere at the end of the eighteenth century reveals a far richer social history than Habermas’s conception of a specifically bourgeois emancipation allows; on the other hand, Habermas’s concentration on *Öffentlichkeit* as a specifically *bourgeois* category subsumes forms of popular democratic mobilization that were always already present as contending and subversive alternatives to the classical liberal organization of civil society in which Habermas’s ideal of the public sphere is confined. From a vantage point in 1989, when the French Revolution is being divested of its radical democratic and popular progressive content, and discussion of the latter returned to certain Cold War simplicities of the 1950s (as “the origins of totalitarian democracy”), apparently without serious dispute, it is no unimportant matter to point to the foreshortening of Habermas’s conception in this respect. (Of course, this is *not* to convict Jürgen Habermas himself of the same ideological syndrome but merely to identify a difficulty that needs clarification.) My four headings of discussion—the findings of current social history, the problem of gender, processes of state formation, and the question of popular politics—are not the only ones under which Habermas’s work could be considered historically. A more extensive discussion of nineteenth-century nationalist movements, or the literature on communications, or the question of popular/mass culture in the Frankfurt School’s notation, would all have been interesting candidates for inclusion. More fundamentally, perhaps, the “linguistic turn” and the “new cultural history” could also be used to cast Habermas’s work in an interesting critical light, as Habermas’s own recent engagement with the legacy of Foucault has already made clear. In particular, the claim to *rational* discourse, certainly in the social and gendered exclusiveness desired by the late-eighteenth-century bourgeoisie, was simultaneously a claim to *power* in Foucault’s sense, and given the extent of Foucault’s influence during the last decade, a whole other discussion might have been developed around this insight. To repeat: none of this diminishes the value and interest of Habermas’s original intervention, particularly given its timing three decades ago. My purpose has not been to dismiss the latter, but to indicate some of the ways in which it needs to be clarified and extended.

## NOTES

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1. Jürgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere," *New German Critique* 3 (1974): 49. Habermas originally developed his argument, of course, in *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (Neuwied, 1962). The page references in parentheses in my text are to the page proofs of the new English edition.

2. Perry Anderson and Peter Dews, in their interview with Habermas, "A Philosophico-Political Profile," in Peter Dews, ed., *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas* (London, 1986), p. 178.

3. Rick Roderick, *Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York, 1986), p. 43.

4. Peter U. Hohendahl, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture: Jürgen Habermas and his Critics," *New German Critique* 16 (1979): 92.

5. Terry Eagleton, *The Function of Criticism: From "The Spectator" to Post-Structuralism* (London, 1984), p. 15.

6. Given the close attention to Habermas's work in the 1970s and 1980s, it is interesting that this, his first major work, which established both his reputation and enduring theoretical interests, has only now received its translation, and indeed, the general ignorance and neglect of its significance in the English-speaking world is rather remarkable. Peter Hohendahl is something of an exception in this respect. Aside from the commentary cited in note 4 above, he also introduced Habermas's work in *New German Critique* 3 (1974): 45–48, and applied it in "Prolegomena to a History of Literary Criticism," *New German Critique* 11 (1977): 151–163. See also his *Literatur und Öffentlichkeit* (Munich, 1974) and *The Institution of Criticism* (Ithaca, 1982). Discussion of *Strukturwandel* is strikingly absent from the main English language commentaries on Habermas's work: Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory* (Berkeley, 1980); Rick Roderick, *Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory*; Anthony Giddens, "Jürgen Habermas," in Quentin Skinner, ed., *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 121–139; John B. Thompson and David Held, eds., *Habermas: Critical Debates* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). This is perhaps most striking of all in John Keane, *Public Life and Late Capitalism: Toward a Socialist Theory of Democracy* (Cambridge, 1984), a work avowedly inspired by a reading of Habermas, but which remarkably manages not to discuss directly or at any length the intellectual context and historical validity of *Strukturwandel* itself. The same is true of Keane's recent two volumes on the current discourse of civil society, which fail to pose the relevance of Habermas's pioneering analysis to the terms of that discussion. See John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London, 1988), and Keane ed., *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives* (London, 1988). In this respect, Joan B. Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, 1988), is an equally striking exception. See also Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man: On the Social Psychology of Capitalism* (New York, 1976).

7. There is an entry for "Private," but even this doesn't deal with the public/private distinction. See Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, revised ed. (New York, 1983), pp. 242–243. For a similar, but immensely more grandiose project, with its place in a very different national intellectual tradition, see Otto



Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 5 vols. (Stuttgart, 1972–1989); and for a succinct introduction to this project, see Keith Tribe, “The *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* Project: From History of Ideas to Conceptual History,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31 (January 1989): 180–184.

8. See the following: J. H. Plumb, “The Public, Literature, and the Arts in the Eighteenth Century,” in Michael R. Marrus, ed., *The Emergence of Leisure* (New York, 1974), pp. 11–37; Plumb, *The Commercialization of Leisure* (Reading, 1973); Plumb, “The New World of Childhood in Eighteenth-Century England,” *Past and Present* 67 (May 1975): 64–95; Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J. H. Plumb, *The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England* (Bloomington, 1982); P. J. Corfield, *The Impact of English Towns, 1700–1800* (Oxford, 1982); Peter Clark and Paul Slack, eds., *Crisis and Order in English Towns, 1500–1700* (London, 1972); Peter Clark, ed., *Country Towns in Pre-Industrial England* (Leicester, 1981); Peter Borsay, “The English Urban Renaissance: The Development of Provincial Urban Culture, c. 1680–c. 1760,” *Social History* 5 (May 1977): 581–603; Borsay, “Culture, Status, and the English Urban Landscape,” *History* 67 (1982): 1–12; Borsay, “The Rise of the Promenade: The Social and Cultural Use of Space in the English Provincial Town, c. 1660–1800,” *British Journal of Eighteenth-Century Studies* 9 (1986): 125–140; Angus McInnes, “The Emergence of a Leisure Town: Shrewsbury 1660–1760,” *Past and Present* 120 (August 1988): 53–87; John Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III* (Cambridge, 1976); Brewer, “English Radicalism in the Age of George III,” in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776* (Princeton, 1980), pp. 265–288; Linda Colley, *In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party, 1714–1760* (Cambridge, 1982); Colley, “Whose Nation? Class and National Consciousness in Britain 1750–1830,” *Past and Present* 113 (November 1986): 97–117; John Money, *Experience and Identity: Birmingham and the West Midlands 1760–1800* (Montreal, 1977); Nicholas Rogers, “The Urban Opposition to Whig Oligarchy, 1720–60,” in Margaret Jacob and James Jacob, eds., *The Origins of Anglo-American Radicalism* (London, 1984), pp. 132–148.

9. The classic account is John Vincent, *The Formation of the British Liberal Party 1857–68* (Harmondsworth, 1972). Patricia Hollis, ed., *Pressure from Without* (London, 1974), is a good introduction to British liberalism’s associational world at midcentury, while Eileen Yeo and Stephen Yeo, eds., *Popular Culture and Class Conflict 1590–1914* (Brighton, 1981), opens a window on its relationship to popular culture. See also the essays on “Animals and the State,” “Religion and Recreation,” “Traditions of Respectability,” and “Philanthropy and the Victorians,” in Brian Harrison, *Peacable Kingdom: Stability and Change in Modern Britain* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 82–259, which (despite the book’s overall complacency) remain fundamental to this subject. A sense of the earlier-nineteenth-century ambience can be had from two collections of the antislavery movement, Christine Bolt and Seymour Drescher, eds., *Anti-Slavery, Religion, and Reform: Essays in Memory of Roger Anstey* (Folkestone, 1980), and David Eltis and James Walvin, eds., *The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Origins and Effects in Europe, Africa, and the Americas* (Madison, 1981). Monographs on particular associations and places are legion. Stephen Yeo’s *Religion and Voluntary Associations in Crisis* (London, 1976) on Reading is the most unruly but also the most interesting. For an excellent view of the whole Gladstonian show in motion, see Paul McHugh, *Prostitution and Victorian Social Reform* (London, 1980).

10. The best introduction to the social context of the Enlightenment is via the work of Franklin Kopitzsch: "Die Aufklärung in Deutschland: Zu ihren Leistungen, Grenzen und Wirkungen," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 23 (1983): 1–21 (with an excellent guide to the wider bibliography); *Grundzüge einer Sozialgeschichte der Aufklärung in Hamburg und Altona*, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1982); Kopitzsch, ed., *Aufklärung, Absolutismus und Bürgertum in Deutschland: Zwölf Aufsätze* (Munich, 1976). More generally, see Otto Dann, "Die Anfänge politischer Vereinsbildung in Deutschland," in Ulrich Engelhardt, Volker Sellin, and Horst Stuke, eds., *Soziale Bewegung und politische Verfassung: Beiträge zur Geschichte der modernen Welt* (Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 197–232; Dann, ed., *Lesegesellschaften und bürgerliche Emanzipation: Ein europäischer Vergleich* (Munich, 1981); Rolf Engelsing, *Analphabetentum und Lektüre: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Lesens in Deutschland zwischen feudaler und industrieller Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart, 1973); Engelsing, *Der Bürger als Leser: Lesergeschichte in Deutschland 1500–1800* (Stuttgart, 1974); Thomas Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur in Deutschland im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert," in *Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie* (Göttingen, 1976), pp. 174–205; Dieter Düding, *Organisierter gesellschaftlicher Nationalismus in Deutschland (1808–1847): Bedeutung und Funktion der Turner- und Sängervereine für die deutsche Nationalbewegung* (Munich, 1984); Gert Zang, ed., *Provinzialisierung einer Region: Regionale Unterentwicklung und liberale Politik in der Stadt und im Kreis Konstanz im 19. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in der Provinz* (Frankfurt, 1978); Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck* (London and New Haven, 1980); Rudy Koshar, *Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg, 1880–1935* (Chapel Hill, 1986), esp. pp. 91–125.

11. The *Journal of Peasant Studies* is the best general guide to this literature, but for access to the discussion of a particular region see Grant Evans, "Sources of Peasant Consciousness in South-East Asia: A Survey," *Social History*, 12 (1987), pp. 193–211. For the French literature see Peter McPhee, "Recent Writing on Rural Society and Politics in France, 1789–1900," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30 (1988): 750–752; Edward Berenson, "Politics and the French Peasantry: The Debate Continues," *Social History* 12 (1987): 213–229; Ted W. Margadant, "Tradition and Modernity in Rural France during the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Modern History* 56 (1984): 667–697.

12. See Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985), a combined and revised edition of two earlier books in German (1968) and Czech (1971), which enjoyed some subterranean influence in the English-speaking world by the later 1970s, mainly through the occasional writings on nationalism of Eric Hobsbawm. See also Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London, 1977, revised ed. 1981). For an introduction to cultural studies, see Richard Johnson, "What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?" *Social Text* 10 (1986/1987): 38–80; and Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies and the Center: Some Problematics and Problems," in Hall et al., eds., *Culture, Media, Language* (London, 1980), pp. 25–48. For relevant work in communications, see James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woollacott, eds., *Mass Communication and Society* (London, 1977); George Boyce, James Curran, and Pauline Wingate, eds., *Newspaper History from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day* (London, 1978); Harry Christian, ed., *The Sociology of Journalism and the Press*, Sociological Review Mon-

ograph 29 (Keele, 1980); Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran, and Janet Woollacott, eds., *Culture, Society and the Media* (London, 1982). For Raymond Williams, see esp. *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford, 1977), and *Culture* (London, 1981). For Gramsci, see Geoff Eley, "Reading Gramsci in English: Observations on the Reception of Antonio Gramsci in the English-Speaking World, 1957–82," *European History Quarterly* 14 (1984): 441–477. Work on Eastern Europe may be approached through Gale Stokes, "The Social Origins of East European Politics," *East European Politics and Societies* 1 (1987): 30–74, and Stokes (ed.), *Nationalism in the Balkans: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York, 1984). For other regions, see Tom Garvin, "The Anatomy of a Nationalist Revolution: Ireland, 1858–1928," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 28 (1986): 468–501; Samuel Clark and James S. Donnelly, eds., *Irish Peasants: Violence and Political Unrest, 1780–1914* (Madison, 1983); Rosalind Mitchison, ed., *The Roots of Nationalism: Studies in Northern Europe* (Edinburgh, 1980).

13. See Eley, *Reshaping the German Right*, pp. 32ff., 150ff. The Heilbronn example comes from Theodor Heuss, *Preludes to Life: Early Memoirs* (London, 1955), pp. 34f. Otherwise, see the basic literature cited in note 10 above, esp. Dann, "Anfänge politischer Vereinsbildung," and Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur."

14. The best analyses are by David Blackbourn, "The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Reappraising German History in the Nineteenth Century," in Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 159–192; and "Politics as Theatre: Metaphors of the Stage in German History, 1848–1933," in Blackbourn, *Populists and Patricians: Essays in Modern German History* (London, 1987), pp. 246–264. In its cultural dimensions, Blackbourn's is the classic Habermasian analysis. See also H. Barmeyer, "Zum Wandel des Verhältnisses vom Staat und Gesellschaft: Die soziale Funktion von historischen Vereinen und Denkmalsbewegung in der Zeit liberaler bürgerlicher Öffentlichkeit," *Westfälische Forschungen* 29 (1978–1979): 125.

15. Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities of German History*, was written to contest this tradition of explanation. In the second half of the 1980s Jürgen Kocka began to revisit the latter in cultural terms, while leaving the political argument about the weakness of liberalism intact; there has also been remarkably little attention to *Vereine* (voluntary associations) under the auspices of Kocka's project. See the following: Kocka, ed., *Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1987); Kocka, ed., *Arbeiter und Bürger im 19. Jahrhundert: Variante ihres Verhältnisses im europäischen Vergleich* (Munich, 1986); Kocka, ed., *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert: Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1988); Ute Frevert, ed., *Bürgerinnen und Bürger: Geschlechterverhältnisse im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1988); Dieter Langewiesche, ed., *Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert: Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich* (Göttingen, 1988); Hannes Siegrist, ed., *Bürgerliche Berufe: Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der Professionen, freien Berufe und Akademiker im internationalen Vergleich* (Göttingen, 1988). With the exception of the second of these titles (which issued from a conference organized by Kocka at the *Historische Kolleg* in Munich in June 1984), this activity was focused on a year-long research project at the Center of Inter-disciplinary Research at Bielefeld University in 1986–1987. In addition, twelve meetings of the *Arbeitskreis für moderne Sozialgeschichte* under the direction of Werner Conze were devoted to the theme of *Bildungsbürgertum* during 1980–1987. See Conze and Kocka, eds., *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1985). Three further volumes from these meetings are planned.

16. See the works by Plumb cited in note 8 above.
17. See Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics*, and "Commercialization and Politics," in McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb, *Birth of a Consumer Society*, pp. 197–262.
18. See Money, *Experience and Identity*.
19. See the works by Borsay cited in note 8 above.
20. Brewer, "Commercialization and Politics," p. 197.
21. Plumb, "The Public, Literature, and the Arts," p. 32.
22. Here, see Borsay, "English Urban Renaissance," pp. 590–593, for the growth of towns as a new type of social center. He picks out four main instances: health resorts (Bath, Tunbridge, Scarborough, Buxton, Harrogate, Cheltenham); county towns and other administrative centers (diocesan centers like Lichfield or other legal centers like Preston, Lancashire, for the Duchy Courts); "travel towns" such as Stamford; and new industrial towns (Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, and Bristol). For a dissenting view, see McInnes, "Emergence of a Leisure Town," which adds to Borsay's picture rather than supplanting it.
23. Money, *Experience and Identity*, p. 29.
24. However, Habermas is silent on the grand question of causality, i.e., the specific causal mechanisms/relationships between, on the one hand, the longer-term processes of social development and, on the other, hand the emergence of specific ideologies, traditions of thought, and cultural patterns, or between each of these and specific political events (whether on the global scale of the French Revolution or the smaller scale of local political conflicts). The question of the bourgeoisie's collective agency is not faced. For my own attempt to pose this question (if hardly to answer it), see Geoff Eley, "In Search of the Bourgeois Revolution: The Particularities of German History," *Political Power and Social Theory* 7 (1988): 105–133.
25. I have made this argument for Britain in Geoff Eley, "Rethinking the Political: Social History and Political Culture in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 21 (1981): esp. 438–457, and in a reworked form in "Edward Thompson, Social History and Political Culture: The Making of a Working-Class Public, 1780–1850," in Harvey J. Kaye and Keith McClelland, eds., *E. P. Thompson: Critical Debates* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 12–49. Some of the most suggestive contributions to this theme have been by Eileen Yeo: "Robert Owen and Radical Culture," in Sidney Pollard and John Salt, eds., *Robert Owen: Prophet of the Poor* (London, 1971), pp. 104ff.; "Christianity in Chartist Struggle 1838–1842," *Past and Present* 91 (1981): 99–139; and "Some Practices and Problems of Chartist Democracy," in James Epstein and Dorothy Thompson, eds., *The Chartist Experience: Studies in Working-Class Radicalism and Culture, 1830–1860* (London, 1982), pp. 345–380. See also James Epstein, "Some Organizational and Cultural Aspects of the Chartist Movement in Nottingham," *ibid.*, pp. 221–268; and Barbara Taylor, *Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism and Feminism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1983). For the wider literature on the political sociability of the French peasantry, see the essays by McPhee, Berenson, and Margadant cited in note 11 above. In particular, see Maurice Agulhon, *The Republic in the Village: The People of the Var from the French Revolution to the Second Republic* (Cambridge, 1982); Edward Berenson, *Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in France, 1832–52* (Princeton, 1984); and Peter McPhee, "On Rural Politics in Nineteenth-Century France: The Example of Rodes, 1789–1851," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23 (1981): 248–277.

26. Gareth Stedman Jones, "Rethinking Chartism," in Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working-Class History 1832–1982* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 90–178.

27. See Geoff Eley, "Nationalism and Social History," *Social History* 6 (1981): 83–107, and Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval, and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914–1923," in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988), pp. 220–230.

28. The classic sources, of course, are Edward Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963), pp. 17–185, and Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (London, 1972). Also see the more recent following works by Hill: *The Experience of Defeat: Milton and Some Contemporaries* (London, 1984); *Turbulent, Seditious and Factious People: John Bunyan and His Church* (Oxford, 1988); and "Why Bother about the Muggletonians?" in Hill, Barry Reay, and William Lamont, *The World of the Muggletonians* (London, 1983), pp. 6–22. See also Lamont, "The Muggletonians, 1652–1979: A 'Vertical Approach,'" *Past and Present* 99 (1983): 22–40, and the subsequent debate between Hill and Lamont, *ibid.*, 104 (1984): 153–163. For some general commentary, see Barry Reay, "The World Turned Upside Down: A Retrospect," in Geoff Eley and William Hunt, eds., *Reviving the English Revolution. Reflections and Elaborations on the Work of Christopher Hill* (London, 1988), pp. 53–71.

29. Nancy Fraser, "What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender," in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds., *Feminism as Critique* (Minneapolis, 1987), pp. 31–55. The quotations are from pp. 41, 45.

30. Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere*, p. 46. Landes explains this opposition to a great extent by a counterreaction against the public role of aristocratic women in the salons of the ancien regime, which then generalized its hostility to the "unnatural" prominence of women in public life and made femininity a general repository for the vices that republican virtue would overcome.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

33. John Keane, Introduction, in Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State*, p. 21.

34. Carole Pateman, "The Fraternal Social Contract," *ibid.*, p. 121. See also Pateman's book, *The Sexual Contract* (Cambridge, 1988); Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere*; Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought* (Princeton, 1981); Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus, eds., *Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche* (New York, 1987); and the brilliant discussions scattered through Dorinda Outram, *The Body and the French Revolution: Sex, Class, and Political Culture* (London and New Haven, 1989). For a dissentient view, see Sylvana Tomaselli, "The Enlightenment Debate on Women," *History Workshop Journal* 20 (1985): 101–124.

35. Catherine Hall, "Private Persons versus Public Someones: Class, Gender and Politics in England, 1780–1850," in Carolyn Steedman, Cathy Urwin, and Valerie Walkerdine, eds., *Language, Gender and Childhood* (London, 1985), p. 11.

36. The approach is much more nuanced than can be described here. See in particular the definition of consumption (heavily influenced by the current discourse of the British intellectual left) as a way of integrating the "private" sphere of "the family and women's labour" into a Marxist discussion of production and social reproduction:

And yet, the creation of the private sphere has been central to the elaboration of consumer demand, so essential to the expansion and accumulation process which characterizes modern societies. The recent work which has analyzed consumption as a process of "cultural production," looks not only at its role in reproduction but also at the creation of need and the ways in which particular desires and pleasures come to define social identities and to be represented as cultural products. This approach has necessarily emphasized the gender dimension. Furthermore, consumption is instrumental in forming and maintaining status, the "relational" element of class, the continual claim and counter-claim to recognition and legitimation. Gender classification is always an important element in the positioning of groups and individuals and the competition for resources which takes place at every level of society. Women, in their association with consumption, are often seen as creators as well as the bearers of status.

See Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850* (London, 1987), p. 29f.

37. Hall, "Private Persons versus Public Someones," p. 11.

38. Davidoff and Hall, *Family Fortunes*, p. 416.

39. Davidoff and Hall are excellent on the complex imbrication of family and economics in the late-eighteenth/early-nineteenth-century English middle class. See *ibid.*, pp. 195–315.

40. Sally Alexander, "Women, Class and Sexual Differences in the 1830s and 1840s: Some Reflections on the Writing of a Feminist History," *History Workshop Journal* 17 (1984): 136, 137, 139. The quotations that follow have the same source.

41. See Dorothy Thompson, *The Chartists: Popular Politics in the Industrial Revolution* (New York, 1984), p. 125, which cites pamphlets by the Manchester Chartist Reginald John Richardson and the London Chartist John Watkins to this effect.

42. Alexander is very good on this. Capitalist transformation of the work process and the concomitant dissolution of existing family controls reflected "the two themes which spurred all visions of a new social order" in the first half of the nineteenth century in Britain—namely, the idea that "labour, as the producer of wealth and knowledge, should receive its just reward" and the belief that "kinship was the natural and proper relation of morality, authority and law." See "Women, Class and Sexual Differences," p. 138. Engels' phrase is taken from *The Condition of the Working Class in 1844*, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *On Britain* (Moscow, 1962), p. 179.

43. There is a useful discussion of this point in Richard J. Evans, "Politics and the Family: Social Democracy and the Working-Class Family in Theory and Practice before 1914," in Evans and W. R. Lee, eds., *The German Family: Essays on the Social History of the Family in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Germany* (London, 1981), pp. 256–288.

44. See Keane, "Remembering the Dead: Civil Society and the State from Hobbes to Marx and Beyond," in *Democracy and Civil Society*, esp. pp. 35f.

45. Pateman, "The Fraternal Social Contract," p. 123.

46. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, vol. 1: *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1974); vol. 2: *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750* (New York, 1980); and vol. 3: *The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730–1840s* (San Diego, 1989); Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1974); Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975); Theda Skocpol,

*States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, 1979); Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966); Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1: *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge, 1986); Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, vol. 2 of *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 198–221.

47. See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, 1944), esp. pp. 139ff.; and Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers, “Beyond the Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi,” in Theda Skocpol, ed., *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (Cambridge, 1984), esp. pp. 52–62. The paraphrase of Polanyi is really Peggy Somers’s.

48. See esp. the following works of Edward Thompson: “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” *Past and Present* 50 (1971): 76–131; “Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture,” *Journal of Social History* 7 (1973–1974): 382–405; *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act* (Harmondsworth, 1975); “Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?” *Social History* 3 (1978): 133–166. I have commented on this aspect of Thompson’s work in “Rethinking the Political,” pp. 432ff.

49. Gwyn A. Williams, “The Concept of ‘Egemonia’ in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes in Interpretation,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 21 (1960): 587.

50. Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, pp. 109f.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

52. Ernesto Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London, 1977), p. 161.

53. Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, “Why Does Social History Ignore Politics?” *Social History* 5 (1980): 269.

54. Stuart Hall, Bob Lumley, and Gregor McLennan, “Politics and Ideology: Gramsci,” in *On Ideology Working Papers in Cultural Studies*, 10 (Birmingham, 1977), p. 68.

55. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London, 1971), p. 54. The earlier quoted phrase, “equilibrium . . .,” comes from Eric J. Hobsbawm, “The Great Gramsci,” *New York Review of Books* 21, no. 5 (April 1974): 42.

56. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 238.

57. Günther Lottes, *Politische Aufklärung und plebejisches Publikum: Zur Theorie und Praxis des englischen Radikalismus im späten 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1979).

58. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 223ff.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 337.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

63. Albert Goodwin, *The Friends of Liberty* (London, 1979), p. 157.

64. Lottes, *Politische Aufklärung*, p. 337.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 263–334.