CIVIL SOCIETY AGAINST THE STATE: POLAND 1980-81

by Andrew Arato

Civil Society?

The categories of civil society are not extraneous to the Polish events. The participants themselves and their Western collaborators have characterized their struggle in terms of society against the state. "The state has not been able to successfully dissolve civil society," writes Smolar in the preface to a volume of writings by Polish dissidents. "The texts . . . are manifestations of the existence and vitality of civil society in a country ruled by a communist party."[1] As Kuron put it, "Society organizes itself as a democratic movement and becomes active outside the limits of the institutions of the totalitarian state."[2] KOR (an acronym for Workers' Defense Committee) is renamed KSS-KOR (Social Self-Defense Committee-KOR) to indicate its support of all initiatives for both interest representation and the defense of civil rights. In one form or another, the idea of the reconstitution of civil society through the rule of law and the guarantee of civil rights, a free public sphere and a plurality of independent associations is present in all of the opposition documents. According to Michnik, today the state can obtain a minimum of legitimacy only if it implements three points of the August 21 Gdansk agreement as the basis for a genuine "new social contract": protection of civil rights, tolerance of public opinion and the acceptance of a compromise "crossing the totalitarian power structure with a democratic mechanism of corporate representation."[3]

While before 1980 most writers generally spoke of a human rights movement (this is more accurate for the Czech opposition around Charter 77), others have been more all-encompassing. Thus, following Kolakowski, Rupnik characterizes the transformation of Polish dissent from 1968 to 1978 as "the end of revisionism and the rebirth of the civil society."[4] In describing the 1980 events, Fenchel and Weis are forced to coin a German term, *Zivilgesellschaft*, to designate something no longer captured by *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* (today the equivalent of "bourgeois society"), i.e., the organization of a plurality of interests outside the state in an increasingly independent social sphere.[5] Along with Pelikan,[6] they speak of the emergence of a dual power between the existing state and a new self-managing society. To be sure, in today's Poland dual power is rarely mentioned. One of the few to have actually used the concept, first secretary Stanislaw Kania, whom no one has ever accused of any

1. In Z. Erard, G.M. Zygier, eds., *La Pologne: Une Société en Dissidence* (Paris, 1978).
2. Interview in *Les Temps Modernes*, quoted by A. Drawicz in Pelikan and Wilke, eds., *Opposition ohne Hoffnung?* (Hamburg, 1979).
3. Cf. "Zeit der Hoffnung," in *Der Spiegel*, No. 38 (September 15, 1980), p. 153.
4. In Rudolf Tökes, *Opposition in Eastern Europe* (Baltimore, 1979), pp. 60ff. The same terminology is used for the Soviet Union, but without adequate justification, by Moshe Lewin, *Political Undercurrents of Soviet Economic Debates*.
5. "Staat, Partei, Gewerkschaft: Thesen zu Polen," in *Links* (November 1980), p. 17.
6. Cf. J. Pelikan, "Bahro's Ideas on Changes in Eastern Europe," in R. Wolter, ed., *Rudolf Bahro: Critical Responses* (White Plains, N.Y., 1980), pp. 168-185.

knowledge of history or political theory, declared in January 1981 that history has no example of dual power and, of course, no such thing will be permitted in Poland. The leadership of Solidarity seems also emphatic on this point. They have stated repeatedly that they are only interested in the workers' interest and not in political power. On January 19, even Lech Walesa stressed the union's non-political character.[7]

This seems to be a crucial tactical point to the extent that a direct challenge to the threatened single party would bring Soviet intervention. Yet, what is at issue is the democratic opposition's underlying premises concerning the society it wants, and thinks possible, in the short run.[8] While the long-range goal is parliamentary mediation between state and society, for the present it is unclear whether the renunciation of state power is only tactical or prefigures a new type of movement that seeks to rebuild structures of social solidarity, bypassing state power altogether. In the latter case, which is the position of KOR and the milieu around Solidarity, there is still a gap between minimal and maximal interpretations of the institutional starting point for a long road that may eventually lead to a parliamentary state and a democratic society. This is not shared by the whole democratic opposition and different strategies have emerged. One point, however, unites them all: the viewpoint of civil society against the state — the desire to institutionalize and preserve the new level of social independence.

Civil Society, West and East

All of the proposed alternatives of independent Polish development are compatible with the re-emergence of civil society. What is at stake here is the relevance to the East European context of a category of early modern Western political theory. Differentiating what from the Greeks to the 18th century has been considered one, the political and the social dimensions have been institutionalized[9] as the state and civil society. This institutionalization was always contradictory[10] and its central mediating element, an emancipated public sphere, has proved to be rather fragile.[11] This

7. Periodically, the members of KOR make the same point: "The democratic movement is not challenging the power of the state in its own sphere or even the leading role of the party in the state. It is not building a new party or seeking to capture and exercise or even participate in state power." Cf. Adam Michnik, "Die Letzte Chance," in *Der Spiegel* (December 23, 1980).

8. These premises are not always articulated clearly or consistently — perhaps deliberately so. When Michnik, for example, argues that the new union will be political only in the sense that unions in England, Italy and the United States are political, one immediately recalls their different political roles from one another, not to mention the new role of the Polish unions. Cf. Michnik, "Zeit der Hoffnung," p. 152.

9. For this concept, cf. C. Castoriadis, *L'Institution Imaginaire de la Société* (Paris, 1975).

10. In his classic *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit* (Neuwied, 1962), Habermas speaks of the contradictory institutionalization of the bourgeois public sphere (the logic of publicity and the logic of private property, i.e., the logic of an all-inclusive discursive process without domination, and that of a new form of exclusion-domination). Since the contradiction has at least three terms (corresponding to the logics of state, society and economy) it may be better to speak of the heterogeneous institutionalization, a term that Castoriadis has coined to indicate his own distance from an earlier position when he spoke only of the institutionalization of capitalism. For the history of the concept of civil society, see Manfred Riedel, "Bürger, Staatsbürgen, Bürgentum" and "Gesellschaft, bürgerliche," in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,* Vol. I (Stuttgart, 1972) and Vol. II (Stuttgart, 1975).

11. Although Habermas' *Strukturwandel* remains the pathbreaking study of the fate of civil society, his lack of emphasis on the role of social movements in constituting civil society, i.e., the bourgeois public sphere, needs correction. More differentiated but far more limited are a series of historical studies on the tensions between state and society in pre-1848 Germany. Cf. R.

contradiction has resulted in projects of social emancipation against the capitalist economy and the non-democratic state. The differentiating, rationalizing tendencies of modernity as well as the need for new forms of social integration may favor the autonomy of society from both the state and the economy. At any rate, contemporary self-management movements in the West can be seen as means for the re-emergence of civil society.[12] Only in Eastern Europe, however, do social movements themselves see their struggle in these terms. Is this a development that, if successful, will regenerate the same contradictions of civil society as in the West, or give rise to something genuinely new, pointing toward the future meaning of emancipation?

In Western Europe, the split between state and civil society would have been unthinkable independently of the state's efforts "from above" in bringing it about. On the other hand, the extent of the critical public sphere mediating between society and the state depended on the strength of the social movements and institutions generated "from above" struggling against the old society as well as the new state. Of course, the struggle against the old society's limitations and against the state's economic tutelage was carried on most effectively by the increasingly powerful interests of a free market economy, themselves reinforced by the rationalizing efforts of modern state bureaucracies. Yet, the social autonomy articulated in the political public sphere and parliamentarianism of Europe and America was brought about by social strata among which the new bourgeoisie was only a part. Thus, three sets of actors were involved in the arena between state and society in Western Europe. In terms of institutional results, the economy or the state turned out to be strongest, society the weakest.

This situation in Eastern Europe was considerably different.[13] A comparable constellation of forces existed until 1917, but did not manage to bring about a separation of state and society — even in the purely economic sense. Everywhere the state was overwhelmingly powerful. Although primarily interested in its own modernization, this state power did seek to organize independent social and economic institutions. While Eastern European autocracy cannot be considered feudalism[14] or even *Ständestaat*, because of the weight of state power, the latter was the result of social compromises that left the old society far more intact here than in Western Europe. While there is a good deal of difference in the strengths of state, economy and society in the three empires dividing what constitutes today's Eastern Europe, on the whole, the state was strongest everywhere and society was by far the weakest.[15] With

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Koselleck, *Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution* (Stuttgart, 1967) as well as his "Staat und Gesellschaft in Preussen 1815-1848" and Werner Conze, "Das Spannungsfeld von Staat und Gesellschaft in Vormärz," both in Conze, ed., *Staat und Gesellschaft in deutschen Vormärz* (Stuttgart, 1962); O. Brunner, *Neue Wege der Verfassungs und Sozialgeschichte* (Göttingen, 1968); L. Gall, "Liberalismus und bürgerliche Gesellschaft. Zu Charakter und Entwicklung der liberalen Bewegung in Deutschland," in Gall, ed., *Liberalismus* (Köln, 1980).

12. This is Alain Touraine's position. See his *L'Après Socialisme* (Paris, 1980), and *Le Voix et la Régard* (Paris, 1978).

13. For the Russian context, where determination from above was most extreme, see Dietrich Geyer, "Gesellschaft als staatliche Verantstaltung. Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte des russischen Behüordenstaats in 18. Jahrhundert," in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland*, ed. D. Geyer (Köln, 1975).

14. Cf. Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*.

15. The Tocquevillian thesis concerning the continuity of absolutism, revolution and post-revolutionary *étatism* should not be applied too mechanically in this context. The destructive leveling of the old society occurred in a less continuous fashion: the task was achieved to a greater extent than in Western Europe by the post-revolutionary (1917) or post-World War II (1945) states. Here lies a crucial difference among the various countries of Eastern Europe today. In Russia the destruction of the old society after 1917 coincided with the endless

the exception of Czechoslovakia, the new state power that completed the destruction of the old society was powerful enough either to destroy or to inhibit the emergence of new institutions of social autonomy. It only realized the negative side of modern civil society. There, the social, economic and cultural primacy of the prerogative state[16] meant that the parameters of civil society were non-existent: the system of needs (excluded by the imperative control plan), the institution of laws (excluded by the idea of substantive justice), the system of plurality (excluded by the one-party monopoly), and the system of publics (excluded by the idea of absolute knowledge).

The absorption of society and the economy by state structures is not fully modern. The incomplete differentiation of state and economy prevents Soviet-type societies from competing economically with advanced capitalist countries and from satisfying the economic needs of East Europeans whose need structure is affected by Western standards. This is overwhelmingly demonstrated by the economic picture and reform attempts in East Europe during the last 10 to 15 years. These attempts deal with the constitution from above of an economy at least partly differentiated from the state without allowing the emergence of social autonomy. These attempts need not have been everywhere equally unsuccessful, as some historical materialistically inclined reform economist must have secretly hoped: under some conditions even *laissez-faire* economics is compatible with autocratic political institutions. Thus, for reasons having to do with unique political traditions inherited from the interwar period, during the Prague Spring in 1968, limited economic and social reforms "from above" dramatically released energies "from below" that captured the ruling party "from within," threatening to reconstitute civil society, i.e., to abolish the existing system altogether.

Ruling parties learned the 1968 lesson well. With the exception of Hungary, where the 1956 events created favorable circumstances for the regime, subsequent reform attempts from above granting any even purely economic autonomy were drastically limited. Two main roads to the reconstitution of civil society were closed. After Hungary in 1956, the first one, the revolutionary overthrow of the authoritarian state from below has been open only in the imperial center, where conditions of social integration are unique because of its being the imperial center and its relative isolation from the rest of the world. After Czechoslovakia in 1968, the second one, the reformist attempt from above, i.e., through the ruling parties themselves, has been considered the functional equivalent of the first by all ruling parties — especially the Soviet party of the imperial center that will not tolerate the overthrow from below or the conquest from within of any of the other ruling communist parties. Today there is the possibility of a third road. The Polish opposition from 1976 to 1980 has shown that there is *at least* the possibility of structural reforms of authoritarian socialism from below.

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strengthening of a state power that was to destroy also the new society in the making in the 1930s. In Bulgaria and Romania the destruction of the old society in 1945 was not even followed by the emergence of a new, modern one. Poland and Hungary represent societies where the interwar period involved uneasy mixtures of survivals from the old regime and elements of the new society. Such a mixture already characterized pre-World War I Germany with modern elements coming to the fore in Weimar to be destroyed by the fascist revolution against modernity. Only Czechoslovakia evolved a fully modern society in the interwar period. In all of these four countries along the western edge of Eastern Europe, the social mix was fully statized after 1948, with some countries enjoying a brief period of social ferment expressed in parliamentarianism and social reform up to 1948.

16. The concept of the prerogative state (*Massnahmenstaat*) comes from Ernst Fraenkel, *Dual State* (New York, 1941).

Can such a model from below lead to a contemporary reinstitutionalization of civil society? Can it lead to a form of civil society unshackled by its historic contradictions? Before turning to the first question, there are three reasons for answering yes to the second. First, unlike the West, or interwar Eastern Europe for that matter, in Poland the struggle for civil society is occurring *after* and not before industrialization. Hence, imperatives for economic growth do not have to play the same role as in the West. The results of a civil society not adequately separated from a centrally planned economy are known to Poles from the Western experience. Secondly, in Poland, the constitution of civil society is not occurring from above. Neither is the state interested in playing such a role that contradicts its principle of organization in a way that did not for Western European absolutism, nor is it prevented from doing so by anyone below. The results of various forms of étatist modernization are also known to the Poles. Thirdly, in the relative absence of the two potential agencies for the constitution of civil society (capitalist logic of industrialization and étatist logic of modernization from above) the social movement in Poland can make an emancipated public sphere far more central in the nascent civil society than anywhere before. Of the three possible institutional centers of civil society — state, economy and the public sphere — until now there has been only the primacy of the first or the second.

On the other hand, the need for some compromise with existing state power, and the potentially powerful influence of the existing Western model of civil society are grounds for pessimism. Can a social movement achieve a workable model of civil society alone, through structural reforms from below? And if so, what kind of civil society will result, given a formally intact, authoritarian state?

Structural Reform From Below

In the 1970s, critical East European intellectuals have realized a reform of the system based on the transformation of the ruling parties "from within" has become impossible as a result of 1968.[17] The political alternative seemed to be revolution or resignation.[18] In 1971, Kolakowski observed that in terms of the classical Marxian tradition, this alternative reduces to one: resignation.[19] Revolution on the periphery of the empire (the 1956 model) would be crushed by the center. In the center itself, on the other hand, it is implausible because of the legitimating advantage provided by an empire organized around a national core. Thus, Kolakowski proposed partial yet structural reforms from below aiming at the reconstruction of the social realm.

This was closer to the forms of East European opposition in the 1970s than the choice between revolution or resignation. In several countries defensive human rights campaigns such as Charter 77 and the Russian Helsinki Watch Committee, reinforced by international publicity, became a factor in dissent politics. In a few countries the seeds of an alternative public sphere have been planted by *Samizdat* literature. In the wake of two major and partly successful working class eruptions, a new offensive

17. Cf. M. Rakovski, *Toward an East European Marxism* (London, 1978). There are some important exceptions. See I. Szelenyi and G. Konrad, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York, 1979). Lately, however, they have been de-emphasizing this aspect. It is completely absent from Konrad's latest work, *Az Autonomia Kisertese* (Paris, 1980).

18. Bahro's *The Alternative in Eastern Europe* (London, 1979), i.e., the building of a new communist party outside the existing one to replace and reabsorb its predecessor as a result of its social hegemony, is impossible. Under conditions of Eastern European state security, such a party cannot be built. More importantly, nowhere is the population interested in yet another Leninist vanguard.

19. . "Thèses sur l'Espoir et le Désespoir," in *La Pologne, op.cit.*, pp. 83, 95.

strategy was formulated in Poland: reforms from below, different from both reform attempts from within the parties and revolutionary challenges from outside. The main articles explicating this strategy, by Kolakowski, Michnik and Kuron, were written in the wake of each of two great working class challenges: 1971 and late 1976. Of course, the new strategy became applicable to 1980 because of the continuity of the workers' experience and, from 1976, other strata. Yet, the conceptualization provided a framework to the challenge from below between 1976 and 1980 — at least in the form of KOR's activity.

The three essays by Kolakowski, Michnik and Kuron move from system to action, anticipating coming events. Kolakowski develops a model of totalitarianism as a society deprived of all social self-defense. If this kind of totalitarianism were successful, it could be overthrown only as a whole. If it is only a tendency laden with internal contradictions, then it can be partially reversed by a counter-tendency: the self-defense of society. According to Kolakowski, the plasticity and limits of a system which, among other things, depends on the social actors' consciousness of this plasticity and limits, can never be theoretically established. What is clear is that the totalitarian project in East Europe is self-contradictory. Thus, the desire for unity clashes with the desire for security, the practical irrelevance of ideology with the need for ideological continuity, the necessity of technical development with its political limits, the need for national legitimacy with the partial surrender of national sovereignty, etc. Whether these contradictions become the system's limitation depends on actions of those below. Without resistance, the system can be successfully totalized. Through constant pressure "by society," which here becomes *partially its own subject,* a society more in harmony with purely social needs can be wrested from the state. Neither national nor popular sovereignty is in this framework an all-or-nothing proposition. Contrary to revolutionaries' theses, partial structural reforms that weaken the existing system are possible. But those who want all will get nothing.

Kolakowski's analysis was further developed by Michnik in 1976.[20] Five years and one uprising later, the position became much more political. The transformation of culture and the reactivation of intellectuals — shaken in 1968 by anti-semitic attacks — made it possible to turn from the party as the agent of reform to independent public opinion. In the wake of the 1971 "social contract" between two parties, only one of which was organized, it was necessary to formally organize this independent pressure from below. Closer to action, its limits could be more clearly defined. Society can organize itself to force great concessions from the power structure, but neither existing links of Poland to the Soviet Union nor one-party rule can be challenged without precipitating Soviet intervention. In this context, party self-democratization à la Prague 1968 is dangerous. The "international context" eliminates both reforms from above and revolution. As long as the Soviet system remains intact, structural reform from below is the last hope for democratization.

According to Michnik, the formation of stable labor organizations after 1976 and the powerful Catholic church's defense of civil rights prevent this strategy from doom. The new strategy of constant struggle for reforms to expand civil liberties and guarantee human rights contributed to the founding of KOR. Once the organization was off the ground, its strategy expanded. In a 1976 pamphlet on oppositional strategy,[21] Jacek Kuron, the most radical organizer, first outlined a systematic

20. Cf. "Une Strategie pour l'Opposition Polonaise," in *ibid. Survey* has published an English version: "The New Evolutionism" in the Summer-Autumn 1976 issue.

21. "Pour une Platforme unique de l'Opposition" in *La Pologne.*

program for the reconstitution of civil society through the re-establishment of the rule of law, an independent public sphere and freedom of association. Ordinarily, these reforms would result in a struggle for parliamentary democracy, but not in the present Polish context. Here Kuron found himself in a paradox. While he remains an advocate of a direct, self-managing form of democracy,[22] he now claims that this is meaningless within totalitarianism and should not exhaust democratic politics. While he realizes that a democratic parliamentary system is beyond the limits defined by one-party rule, he proposes social self-management as the goal of reforms from below. Social movements as the loci of a new social autonomy provide a solution to this paradox. A multiplicity of social movements (peasants, workers, Catholics and intellectuals) can progressively limit the party-state on the basis of de-collectivized agriculture, *de facto* compromises concerning price structure and the emergence of workers' self-organization, religious and cultural freedom for church activity, *de facto* toleration of a second public sphere, etc.

Three major questions arise here. First, should social movements be emphasized in a presumably totalitarian context where no form of social independence is permitted? Second, if the movements from below are possible, will they not need some support from the ruling party to be successful? Third, if action from below and above can be coordinated, will not the role of reform down below amount either to very little or to a struggle for parliamentarianism? These questions were debated between 1976 and 1980. A positive answer to the first meant the reintroduction of the totalitarian thesis primarily for polemical rather than theoretical reasons. As long as one seriously expected the system's liberalization, the totalitarian thesis remained unacceptable. For critical East European intellectuals its acceptance would have meant the end of one strategy before the birth of a new one.

With the political stress on social reform movements from below, the other totalitarian thesis concerning total autonomization of society also needed re-examination. Kolakowski saw this as a statist tendency that will be only as successful as political resistance will allow it to be. After 1976 this point was elaborated in terms of informal, familial, and small-scale private networks of social relations that can provide self-defense even in the absence of formal movements. This largely spontaneous, defensive response makes possible a higher, more organized level of social plurality. Circles of family and friends protect the private sphere from an administered public one. They permit the defense of a given society, its customs, mentalities, its national and local identities. The reconstruction of society is possible because the foundations are there. Only more complex social ties have to be reconstituted.[23]

22. J. Kuron, K. Modzelewski, *Monopolsozialismus* (Hamburg, 1969).

23. Kasimierz Wojcicki, "The Reconstruction of Society" in this issue of *Telos*. Some of the same arguments are made in Konrad's new book. In its original version, the totalitarian thesis applies to countries where the system was not imposed from outside. Cf. Wojcicki, *op.cit.* To mention only two sets of contrary sources here, see recent literature (Skilling, Griffiths, Hough *et al.* in political science, Rittersporn in history) on interest conflict in the Soviet Union, as well as the various political culture schools stressing the compromises of the party-state with traditional Russian forms. The thesis of the survival of society and of its potential political significance applies to several other East European countries. In Hungary, for example, where no one at present envisions the possibility of social movements as in Poland, Hegedüs has stressed the potential plurality of social forces seeking some autonomy and independent public expression. From the viewpoint of macro-policy, Hegedüs admits that the ruling party can integrate but not abolish them. Speaking from direct experience, Kis and Bence have indicated under what conditions private life becomes the foundation for a new public life. Pointing to the complicated

Thus, the rediscovery of society under state socialism can lead to an opposition program, but one more limited than that of reform social movements. Even in the Polish situation, however, it is questionable whether such movements from below are adequate bases for a reform program. Thus, the necessity of a preliminary split, or a differentiation of the ruling parties, as a precondition is presumed by Bahro and Hegedüs, even after 1968. This is even more true for Pelikan, who sees the model of 1968 as fundamental.[24] All successful democratizations of Eastern European regimes presuppose action both from above and below. According to him, only the Prague Spring provided an adequate model of coordination — the beginning rather than the end of a strategy for democratization. Even if significant changes since 1968 have strengthened the conservative forces within the ruling parties — especially neo-Stalinists and the military-industrial complex — and have eliminated all serious intra-party discussion, the situation remains unchanged. No movement from below can alone carry out significant reform programs and the parties are not in principle closed to reform ideas. If after '68 reform initiatives have shifted toward outside the ruling parties, and the building of parallel institutions has become necessary and possible, the opposition must not overlook the possibility to "work inside" ruling parties, splitting rationally thinking functionaries from the conservatives.[25]

Two irreconcilable political differences emerge here. The first concerns the source of long-run initiatives. Is it from above (older communist reformism) or an alternative to it (Bahro), or is it from below, in a pluralistic society (KOR)? The second concerns the basis of cooperation. Is this an identity or similarity of goals, or merely compatibility of fundamentally different goals? As Kuron once put it, KOR believes only in the pragmatism of those in power and not in the existence of a liberal wing in the party.[26] Presented with an organized movement from below, the party's pragmatic wing may realize that the necessary crisis management of the existing system can only work on the basis of these new facts. This may lead to a reconsideration of the movement's moribund experiments of economic reforms. This can be the basis of a

networks of personal ties among intellectuals and workers that stood in the way of the emergence of atomized "lonely crowds," they argue that, under crisis conditions, normal adjustments can become the basis of collective expression. According to them, in Poland this is the foundation of lasting social movements. But even in Hungary — where the opposition is almost exclusively intellectual — the existing network of personal ties provides the basis for an alternative, critical public sphere, now in formation. Cf. Andras Hegedüs, "Democracia és Szocializmus Keleten és Nyugaton" (Democracy and Socialism in East and West), in *Magyar Fuzetek* (Paris, 1978), No. 1. An English version is in Coates and Singleton, eds., *The Just Society* (Nottingham, 1977). For Kis and Bence's critical response to Hegedüs, see in the same journal: "Magjegyzések Hegedüs Andras nyilt leveléhez" (Notes on the Open Letter of A. Hegedüs). In more or less the same debate, Vajda has also stressed the possibility in Hungary of an alternative public sphere, but also warned that under conditions entirely different than in Poland the mechanical imitation of the specific model of the Polish opposition would lead to a new vanguardism. Cf. *Magyar Fuzetek* (Paris, 1978), No. 2.

24. Cf. his two articles, "Der Kampf um Menschenrechte" in *Menschenrechte. Ein Jahrbuch zu Osteuropa* (Hamburg, 1977) and "Reform und Revolution: die falsche Alternative" in *Opposition Ohne Hoffnung? Jahrbuch zu Osteuropa 2* (Hamburg, 1979) as well as his "Bahro's Ideas," *op.cit.*,

25. Under this formula Pelikan hopes to reunite the opposition while Bahro admits the impossibility of changing the ruling party from within, and Michnik recognizes the necessity of having "partners" if not "allies" within the ruling parties.

26. After 1968, there are two reasons to doubt the existence of such a wing: (1) the often noted de-ideologization of parties closing off the possibility of a purely imminent critique; and (2) the actual experience in 1968 of the incompatibility of genuine liberalization and the system's organizational principles.

"partnership" between the opposition and a section of the party, leading to a new social compromise between state and society. This has been KOR's position from 1976 to today.

The idea of a "historic compromise" has also repeatedly come up in Hegedüs' writings between 1977 and 1980, but with a different stress. This raises the third question: is there a third possibility in Eastern Europe between two forms of compromise between society and the state, each of which is useless from the viewpoint of one of the two sides? This issue was debated within the Hungarian opposition, between Hegedüs, seeking to move from reformism from above to reformism from below, and Kis and Bence, representing KOR's position. The disagreement expressed two different interpretations of the kind of possible and desirable state-society duality in East Europe — a disagreement that also surfaced in Poland during the 1980 events. While often criticized for his party-directed reform strategy in the 1960s, Hegedüs was one of the first outside of Poland to raise the perspective of the restoration of civil society as a state-society duality transcending traditional liberal division of the public and the private without accepting the dissolution of either. Using Habermas' double conception of critical *Oeffentlichkeit* as the "political" dimension of the "private" sphere and the social communicative dimension of the state sphere, he argues that both the social and the political dimensions need to be public[27] in order to be the foundation of a protected privacy.

When he worked out his program and the strategy of its realization — without any knowledge of Polish developments — what emerged was a minimal program for the reconstitution of civil society. He does assign initiative to social movements from below, but he expects an unusually high degree of tolerance and even support from above. Although he defines the task of the social sphere as "authority" over the political bureaucratic sphere that continues to exercise "power," how this authority is to control anything is left extremely vague. Since he rejects both interest representation (e.g., independent trade unions)[28] and especially party pluralism in the political sphere, it is not clear whether his plurality could be organized at all, although this is the only thing that would distinguish it from the latent interest groups of Soviet and East European society. The charge of conservatism is not fair here, since Hegedüs also indicates from the system's viewpoint how societies must change to recover their socio-economic dynamism and solve their endemic rationality and information crisis. Yet, he is open to Kis' and Bence's charge that the plausibility of his program rests on an ultimate compatibility of his proposal with the existing system's organizational principle. What Hegedüs' analysis lacks is an emphasis on organized pressure forcing the power structure to allow something not compatible with its interests. Finally, he does not evaluate existing East European movements realistically: "The movements are both stronger and weaker than Hegedüs wants. Stronger, whether they can realize their goals does not depend on the power structure's good intentions. Weaker, because they cannot replace independent institutions of representation."[29]

To the extent that social movements are not strong enough to replace existing one-party rule by a multi-party one, Hegedüs has a point. Here he avoids an apology

27. Hegedüs, "Democracy," *op.cit.*, p. 85. It is another matter that he does not propose any scheme for making public the official state sphere in any sense other than the pre-modern representative public sphere in Habermas' typology. He consciously rejects the Western model of a political public in Parliament.

28. Cf. interview in *Menschenrechte, op.cit.*, p. 394.

29. Kis and Bence, *op.cit.*, p. 111.

for contemporary Western societies where, without the direct democracy of significant social movements, a multi-party system can also be seen as monolithic. Kis and Bence are correct, however, in pointing out that without representative institutions there are no mechanisms of compromise among social movements — except when imposed from above. Hegedüs' insistence, paralleled by Bahro, that the internal structure of state socialist societies is more integrated than in capitalist countries takes this *de facto* integration from above for granted. This is the real weakness of his position. Its strength is its acceptance of the state-society duality. This is bypassed by Kis and Bence through the struggle for the transformation of the state sphere. They do stress that without the institutionalization of some kind of pluralism, even in situations of political crisis the unity of the power structure will be re-established and room to maneuver will be severely limited. But does it follow that the plurality of social movements can be institutionalized and coordinated only through the establishment of a multi-party, parliamentary form of political pluralism?

The absence of immediate political relevance allowed Hegedüs and Kis and Bence to draw out the ultimate implications of two diverging interpretations — implications that, in the Polish context, were suppressed for political reasons. The actual evolution of the strategy and its many successes from 1976 to 1980 were to narrow the distance between interpretations. During this period there was increasingly little difference between theorists as different as Kolakowski and Brus, Pelikan and the spokesmen of Charter 77, Hegedüs and his two younger compatriots.

While many of the unnecessary paradoxes of both maximalism and minimalism were solved in practice, many real questions were temporarily put aside. Thus, there was an increasing consensus around the following four points, at least among Polish and Hungarian intellectuals: (1) The limit of reform from below is constituted by the given state institutions, i.e., the single-party system that cannot be overthrown (1956) or democratized from within (1968); (2) The means of pressure from below are organized as open and public, un-conspiratorial and non-avant garde social movements — each representing one constellation of interests. (3) Pressure from below can force the existing system to adhere to its own legality as well as to *de facto* toleration of the plurality constituted by social movements. (4) The organization of plurality, in particular of an alternative, critical public sphere, can bypass the state altogether by setting up parallel institutions. Of course, here too national and international pressures are necessary for the survival of these parallel institutions. (5) Legality, plurality, publicity, though important means of organizing pressure on the state, are to be seen above all as ends in themselves.

Point five characterizes the string of successes of the social movement in Poland between 1976 and 1980, as well as its limits. Of course, the three categories typify the 19th century ascent of civil society — only the system of needs is missing. In other words, the opposition succeeded in achieving tolerance for its activity, but not in forcing the state to change policy — especially in the economy. Facing an unfolding civil society it was forced to tolerate, the party-state chose self-isolation and immobilism. The results were partial victory of the 1976 movement defending the old constitution against changes that were to formalize the leading role of the party and the existing relation to the Soviet Union; partial victory for workers prosecuted for their role in 1976; relative success in creating committees for organizations of workers, peasants and students; and surprisingly high degrees of success in establishing institutions of an alternative public such as extensive *Samizdat* publications of books and journals, and the flying university. Most important, the various movements and

institutions were closely coordinated by the communication networks of human rights groups and Catholic intellectuals.[30]

Another result was the economic near-collapse of the system steered by a party-state unwilling to undertake any reforms that could split its ranks while threatened from below. The massive reliance on foreign credits and imported capital goods required serious reforms. Without them, they could only win time and eventually contribute to the proportions of the disaster.[31] Once the crisis came, industrial workers were able to achieve something new in the history of Soviet-type systems: the *legalization* of an independent, self-managing institution of interest representation — the independent labor union Solidarity. Beyond this, with the acceptance of the 21 points in the Gdansk accords, they have received a set of political promises amounting to the legalization of an independent cultural sphere as well as a set of economic promises unrealizable without large-scale economic reforms. All this has occurred in the context of (1) an unreformed party-state, supported by increasing threats from the Soviet Union as well as East Germany and Czechoslovakia; (2) a raging economic crisis; and (3) the spectacular unfolding of literally dozens of movements, projects for self-management and self-administration under the umbrella of an independent union with ten million members.

The Question of Dual Power

Without Soviet intervention Poland will never be the same. But what kind of society can emerge on the basis of structural reforms from below that leave the old system's institutional core intact? It was in 1976 and independently of the emerging pattern in Poland that the term "dual power" was first applied to Eastern Europe, by Bahro. What he probably had in mind was a repetition of the classic pattern of February to October 1917, itself interpreted as the Bolsheviks' growing hegemony coexisting with a classical form of bourgeois state power, leading to the establishment of a new, one-party state-society. For Bahro, a new League of Communists is to play the Bolsheviks' role, split from the Communist Party, but the core of a future unified power structure. The irrelevance of this strategy needs no further emphasis here. What is more interesting is that, in 1978, Pelikan interpreted, or deliberately misinterpreted, Bahro's dual power to mean the emergence of "parallel structures alongside official institutions — for example, book publishing houses and periodicals, universities, autonomous trade unions, workers' committees, petitions to official agencies, committees to defend the persecuted, etc."[32]

Though very sympathetic, the description involves institutions with rather different relations to political power. At any rate, it no longer describes a situation in which one institution, the independent trade union, because of its new legal status, size, militance, organization and communication, embodies an unprecedented challenge to the party-state. Outside of Poland, some refer to the new situation as one of double power which can be stabilized and expanded.[33] Others, however, see it as a

30. For three good summaries and analyses, see Rupnik, *op.cit*; Joseph Kay, "The Polish Opposition," and Andrzej Drawicz, "Experience of the Democratic Opposition," both in *Survey* (Fall 1979).

31. Cf. Renate Damus, "The Economic and Political Causes of the Strike Movements in 1980," in this issue of *Telos*.

32. "Bahro's Ideas," *op.cit.*, p. 181.

33. Cf. G. Bence, "Une Nouvelle Formule," in *L'Alternative* (January-February 1981), p. 34; who uses the term "counter power" to indicate a form of political power that does not seek to substitute itself for the party or the state.

contradiction which could justify the use of force from above *or* outside.[34] While in Poland the party takes something near this second position, a significant part of the Western mass media also considers Solidarity as Poland's *de facto* second political party. In this context, what is the meaning of the union leadership's repeated insistence that the group is non-political?[35]

First, emphasis should be placed on interest representation. This is what is new in the Polish situation as against experiments in council democracy where it is a question of rebuilding a monolithic order from the ground up. Solidarity considers it necessary to represent empirical workers' interests against whoever holds political and especially economic power — even against the organizationally separate agencies of industrial self-management. Here is the significance of an independent union as the organizational form of the current struggle. Secondly, the Solidarity leadership accepts the existing structure of the state and the leading role of the party as given. But, third, the topic of dual power and, with it, of the union's political nature, is far from exhausted. In Poland today, everything is political. Michnik's response to this remark, and his cautious reference to Solidarity, is revealing. The independent union, he says, is not political in the sense that "it does not seek political power in the state."[36]

But a force capable of pushing back state power, of occupying some of the vacated space, of controlling and constraining what cannot be eliminated, replaced or diminished — such a force must be an enormous political force in a previously totally political society. As Kuron put it, the movement of industrial workers now institutionalized as Solidarity has brought about a new level of independence of civil society.[37] But what role should it play? Is it to be (1) *the* alternative power bringing about the further legal and institutional realization of civil society; or (2) one of the *many* alternative powers to do so; or (3) one form of interest representation under the new situation? Kuron himself says that he has moved from (3) to (2) because only a rapid democratization of Polish society can save the existing state structure from an uncontrollable revolutionary challenge (hence, disintegration followed by Soviet intervention).[38] Such a democratization is impossible without Solidarity continuing to play a key political role. Kuron is serious, however, about this role being, at most, that of *primus inter pares*. No one in Poland seeks to remythologize the workers as the universal subject. Even in this radical interpretation, Solidarity's aim is not to establish unity but autonomous heterogeneity, i.e., its political function should be to defend the establishment of a whole host of associations that in the future would make the union one institution among equals. On the other hand, there should be no question for Kuron of depoliticizing the independent union and other autonomous associations already in existence. This is under attack from two sides: is it not seeking to repoliticize a society deeply tired of its politicization, or alternately, does it not propose a politicization from below that will produce heterogeneity without any coordination?

The first objection is by Wojcicki,[39] a Catholic intellectual advising Solidarity.

34. This is a conclusion that is somehow to be avoided on the level of action. Cf. C. Lefort, "Reculer les Frontiers du Possible," in *Esprit* (January 1981).

35. Cf. "Les Dirigents de 'Solidarité' Face au Pouvoir" in *L'Alternative* (Jan.-Feb., 1981).

36. "What We Want to Do and What We Can Do," in this issue of *Telos*.

37. See the interview with him in *Der Spiegel*, Dec. 15, 1980, p. 107.

38. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 105-107, and especially, "Un Chemin sans Retour," *Esprit* (January 1981), pp.68-72. Indeed, between these two statements (the one in *Esprit* is the earlier one), a slight shift can be seen in his position. An edited version of this last article has appeared in *Dissent* (Winter 1981), pp. 34-39, under the title "What Next for Poland?"

39. "The Reconstruction of Society," *op.cit.*

Against a social movement increasingly better organized with the independent union as its vanguard, he proposes the creation of independent social institutions constituting a field of social activity wrested away from the omnipotent party apparatus. This achievement he sees as the consequence of a cultural rather than a political process in Poland, and it expresses "the radical need to depoliticize society." Unions should remain unions rather than becoming part of a pluralist system in the making. They should restrict themselves to the defense of employees. He sees KOR as proposing unions as the potential centers of industrial democracy and self-management.

Wojcicki is clearly influenced by the Western European model of civil society and by the Polish church. Thus, he accuses KOR of being still Marxist, of advocating the repoliticization of society, a vanguard role for the working class, and a council democracy compromising the unions' independence. On this level, KOR is *post*- rather than *neo*-Marxist. Even Kuron sees social movements as the reconstitution of civil society in the sense Wojcicki has in mind. If Kuron proposes anything resembling a vanguard role for the unions, this is only to help build other associations of independent interest representation that would challenge this role. He insists on the full organizational separation between unions and future organs of industrial self-management, both because he wants to preserve independent workers' interest representation against any management (including their own), and because he does not want the unions to grow into a bureaucratic-political role, taking responsibility for the decisions of a state system that remains alien to them.

Objections such as Wojcicki's drive Kuron to restate the fundamental disagreement beyond dual power, in terms of the power of society.[40] Both seek the best strategy of avoiding Soviet intervention. To Kuron, this danger lies not in the radical democratization of society but in its insufficient institutionalization that would lead to chaos since the party-state's authority is in shambles. No one can stop the process of democratization without military intervention. In this sense, Wojcicki's suggestion concerning radical depoliticization is irrelevant. But this only makes the integration of the new heterogeneity all the more urgent. Kuron discounts that this can occur *either* through reintegration from above *or* through the democratization of the *whole* system from within because of the apparatus' resistance. Yet, a social system organized according to opposed principles remains extremely unstable and therefore under the threat of intervention.

To solve this problem, Kuron proposes something not only beyond dual power, but also beyond the limits of the new evolutionism. Given that the Russians cannot be fooled about what is occurring in Poland, i.e., a general democratization from below, he proposes to fool them all the same. Assuming that anarchy leads to intervention, but that democratization of Polish society may be acceptable to the Soviets "within limits," i.e., the continued existence of the party's monopoly, he proposes a form of institutionalization to overcome social disorganization and preserve this monopoly — though it is unclear how much the latter is worth in the scheme. Society, i.e., the existing movements, needs to develop unified institutions — a system capable of presenting the party-state power structure with unified demands. Accordingly, economic plans can be reached through coordinated discussions among unions, intellectuals, peasants and the organs of industrial self-management. It is not clear what the party-state is left to do in a Poland so organized — to develop its own

40. "Un Chemin," *op.cit.*, pp. 68-71.

alternatives and propose them to "society" for confirmation, rejection or negotiation, or to perform administrative and police functions supervised and controlled from below?

The second alternative unites conceptions of direct democracy in the cells of society, with some kind of pluralistic integration that utilizes only the professional bureaucratic apparatus of the existing party-state structure in an administrative capacity. In such a system, to use Szelenyi's ironic formulation, the only thing left for the Communist Party is to assume ceremonial functions resembling the English House of Lords.

Whether the new evolutionism remains a plausible framework for further Polish developments depends on the successful institutionalization of some version of dual power, absent from both Wojcicki (who proposes the depoliticization of society) and Kuron (who proposes the depoliticization of the party-state). Michnik, on the other hand, interprets the Gdansk accords of August 31 as potentially a new social contract between two organized agents: state and society. The compromise is new because it is the first time that both parties are organized. This duality of powers (he does not use the term) may contradict "the sociology of power relations." Yet, he argues that knowledge of limits in Poland by both sides makes possible such an institutional solution.

The party knows it can destroy the new social plurality by appealing for the foreign intervention it abhors. The social movement is constantly reminded that the expropriation of the party's power is beyond limits. Thus, the conditions for a partnership between state and society are provided by external threats. Its stability, however, depends on the party-state becoming a credible partnership. Only a new respect for legality and for the actual plurality of public opinion can relegitimate the state. Finally, in order to avoid the spontaneous destruction of state power from below, negotiation and bargaining between state and society must be institutionalized: forms of legitimate pressure other than strike threats must be found. This general framework is called vaguely but significantly "the crossing of the totalitarian structure of power with the democratic mechanism of corporate representation." According to Michnik, the overall arrangement can be the basis of a stable but plastic equilibrium. The party-state's goal will remain the reintegration of the social associations, while society's goal will be the preservation and extension of its independence.

If Kuron is deliberately vague about the terms of the compromise between the new society and the old state, Michnik remains abstract concerning the contract "that society must conclude with itself, a second social contract." Both recognize that the present unity of Polish society is a negative one. Agreement concerning what is opposed masks important disagreements and conflicts of interest. While Kuron bypasses the vertical structure of compromise with his proposal for a pluralistic "system of society" integrating dozens of autonomous democratically organized groups, Michnik's more plausible proposal of compromise modelled in the August 31 accords leaves open the questions: With whom is the state to negotiate? Which social units are to be part of the negotiation processes? How are they related to each other?

The Question of Plurality

For most of the democratic opposition in Eastern Europe, totalitarianism and pluralism represent exclusive alternatives on interest integration. Western social science approaches to systems of the Soviet type have been in transition from a totalitarian, monolithic paradigm to one that considers these systems quasi-pluralistic

and characterized by interest group conflicts. Both sets of positions are open to the same objection: monolithic forms of organization and interest group pluralism do not exhaust the possible forms of interest aggregation in complex societies.[41] Nothing proves this better than the highly fluid political situations such as 1980-81 Poland. Here some of the concepts developed in recent critical literature on interest intermediation seem useful.[42] While these concepts have not yet been meaningfully applied, some relevant definitions can be derived that amount to a restatement of the system theoretical interpretation of "liberalization" as crisis management:

(1) The classical organization of intermediate social levels under authoritarian state socialism is "monistic." It involves a large set of groups, or rather organizations, fixed in number, singular, in part ideologically selective, in part compulsory in membership, non-competitive, internally hierarchical, created or totally reformed by the party-state that controls their leadership selection, formulates their "interests" and resolves their conflicts vertically.[43]

(2) Reform from above, i.e., this system's crisis management, involves a transition to a state corporatist version of interest intermediation allowing the recognition of new groups emerged as a result of social change as well as limited independence to already existing organizations.[44] This might involve the replacement of direct state controls with indirect ones, state appointment of leadership by veto power, vertical formulation of demands and resolution of conflicts by some combination of vertical and horizontal procedures, both free of open conflict.

(3) A transition to a "societal corporatist" variant similar to the latter, except that the origins of groups are more independent, conflict-free procedures are guaranteed by horizontal bargaining without state repression. This involves a reconstitution of a version of civil society and is not compatible with the system's organizational principle. In many countries allowing the constitution of independent groups would mean the emergence of voluntary, non-hierarchical and conflict-oriented pluralist and syndicalist organizations. For existing regimes, 1968 is again the negative model of just such a development.[45]

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41. If the Western conflict paradigm of Skilling *et al.* too easily transposes to Soviet-type societies the pluralistic model, this is because of their not particularly democratic interpretation of it for Western societies. Even this version of the model is not easily applicable to the East. The Eastern European opposition realizes that the pluralist model does not describe their societies but this is in part because of their uncritical identification of a highly democratic version of pluralism with existing Western societies.

42. See especially the essay that started the discussion: Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" Pike and Strich, eds., *The New Corporatism* (Notre Dame, 1974), as well as the special issue (April 1977) of *Comparative Political Studies*. See also the interesting but problematic article by Daniel Chirot, "The Corporatist Model and Socialism," in *Theory and Society* (March 1980) and the much older but still useful article by Andrew Janos, "Group Politics in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralist Model," in Huntington and Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York, 1970).

43. Cf. Schmitter, *op.cit.*, for this concept as well as for the distinction between state and societal corporatism used below and for a redefinition of pluralism and syndicalism.

44. Cf. Chirot, *op.cit.* Unfortunately, Chirot overestimates the completeness of this transition and underestimates the oscillation between monism and corporatism that he also mentions. Postulating that Eastern European societies are already corporatist, he mistakenly believes that "liberalization" (i.e., reform from above) involves a shift to a more democratic form of corporatism.

45. As Chirot argues, Yugoslavia has some significant societal corporatist elements that have been initiated from above. But this occurred under conditions of political, national and revolutionary legitimacy. Cf. Bogdan Denitch, *Legitimation of a Revolution*. And even here one

(4) Under conditions of authoritarian state socialism, pluralist and syndicalist interest representation and conflict resolution can be institutionalized only from below. Once this occurs (as in Poland after 1956), the task of crisis management from the regime's viewpoint is the reintegration of the new forms under state corporatist arrangements. Under such conditions, societal corporatism, as a form of crisis management undesirable for both sides, becomes nevertheless possible.

The situation in Poland between the summer of 1980 and at least Jaruzelski's assumption of the premiership was characterized by a highly unstable pluralist milieu typical of periods of dissolution of other dictatorships.[46] There was a high degree of conflict and the coexistence of interest associations of all types.[47] The situation is characterized by several existing "projects" to institutionalize a more stable set of relations among social groups:

(A) To suppress the 1980 movement, even at the cost of Soviet intervention. This is the strategy of sections of the party apparatus, but not of the whole leadership. It is a question of local, regional, middle-level party interests that would have to be sacrificed in any other solution of the crisis. The goal of this strategy is the restoration of monist organizations and interest aggregations.

(B) The most the ruling party can aim for without outside intervention is a compromise in which other major social institutions such as the church, the union and perhaps the military would be allowed to participate. Limitation of public discussion would allow this to function not only in a compulsory and conflict-free manner, but also by preserving the undisputed primacy of the party-state. This is the state corporatist solution.

(C) Some Catholic intellectuals powerful in Solidarity (such as Wojcicki) favor depoliticization of society, restricting the independent union to narrower concerns and concentrating the movement on culture. This is modelled after the Catholic church's role during the last decade and represents a societal corporatist alternative. It differs from state corporatism because of its insistence on the independence of institutions and, in particular, on a public sphere guaranteeing not only the population's cultural autonomy, but also a structure of compromise involving genuine controls on state activities.

(D) The first of the two alternatives defended by KOR (in particular Michnik) can be characterized as societal pluralism, or pluralism restricted to civil society. Accepting the monolithic structure of the state, this alternative projects independent, horizontal negotiation and compromise among significant institutions of a destatized but not depoliticized society as the starting point of unified negotiations with state power. The independent political activity of society distinguishes this from the model in (C), though the results of compromise here would also be controlled by a pluralistic and uncensored public sphere.

(E) The second alternative defended by KOR (in particular Kuron) differs from (D)

may ask, as does Janos, *op.cit.*, whether societal corporatism (i.e., local and workers' control) represents conflict resolution primarily in areas defined as non-strategically central by the ruling party (whose central concerns are organized according to monistic or state corporatist criteria).

46. This is how Schmitter characterizes the post-Franco epoch in Spain (*op.cit.*, p. 127). In fact, the example of Spain has come up several times in the writings of the Polish opposition — especially Michnik.

47. There were interest associations that were monistic (the party and its transmission belts), old corporatist (the church), modern corporatist (the army), pluralist (unions, associations of intellectuals, students and peasants) and syndicalist (locally or production-based councils and cooperatives).

because it de-emphasizes the state in actual policy making, but also stresses a self-democratizing society on a plurality of levels — all of which actively participate in policy making. Lacking a better name, such an arrangement could be called syndicalist and would reduce the existing party-state to the execution of the will of society in internal affairs, and to the will of the Soviet Union in external affairs (Finlandization).

(F) Finally, the "revolutionary" alternative of the KPN (Moczulski) is political, parliamentary pluralism that presupposes the political power of Poland's traditional parties. Applying exclusively Western models, this solution would also have no interest in the new forms of democracy that have emerged in Poland, nor in a politicized version of civil society. Given the nationalist character of this alternative and its incompatibility with any promise with the ruling party-state, it would immediately lead to Soviet intervention.

Given the constant danger of Soviet intervention and the undoubted hegemony in Polish society of the democratic movement, the six alternatives reduce to two serious ones: societal corporatism with elements of state corporatism, and societal pluralism with elements of syndicalism. The following table indicates some key differences:

	corporatist	pluralist
1. No. of significant groups	small, fixed	larger, unfixed
2. Structure	hierarchical	generally non-hierarchical
3. Conflict potential	non-competitive	competitive
4. Relation to politics	some state controls over leadership selection, demand articulation (at least in form of veto)	self-managing, no state controls whatsoever over elections and demand articulation.
5. Ideological affinity	nationalist, Catholic	liberal, democratic, democratic socialist
6. Organizational principle	authoritarian, state socialist	dual power, preserving authoritarian state socialism in state sphere
7. Immanent evolutionary trend	state corporatist	democratic syndicalist

The aims of the democratic movement and the ruling party are clear enough. Assuming that either would prefer the solution of its Polish opponent to Russian intervention,[48] the question reduces to an immanent Polish balance. But the problem is more complex, because the existence of the corporatist alternative is itself backed by

48. Unfortunately, this cannot be assumed in the case of the party where the apparatus must be distinguished from the leadership — not to speak of the rank and file, which may prefer the more democratic alternative in any case.

threat of Soviet intervention. Since this model is a half-way step toward the state corporatism achieved by other Eastern European regimes preserving the authoritarian state socialist organization principle, it can be considered Poland's best hope to avoid its allies' "fraternal" help. Nevertheless, given the already existing level of democratization of Polish society, the ruling party cannot impose its model by itself.

The ruling party can have a corporatist solution only with the help of allies. In this respect the Catholic Church is crucial. Although it is part of the anti-state movement, the church's emphasis on social order and its internal hierarchical organization may predispose it toward corporatism. While old corporatist in structure, this does not prevent it from participating in a neo-corporatist structure of compromise any more than in several other Catholic countries. Neither the church's past nor its present provides unambiguous clues to its future. An integral part of the authoritarian republic before the war, in the post-war period it was the only legal institution of an independent civil society. The democratic opposition is therefore right to point to the church as a model of an independent institution under totalitarianism able to exert pressure and to enter into acceptable compromises with state power.[49] Although an element of civil society, the church represents both the old civil society of privileged orders and the modern one based on legal equality and individual rights. It opposes the communist established church with its atheistic state religion in the name of religious freedom (hence, the separation of church and state). It also fights, however, in the name of some of its lost privileges, and as an alternative established church seeking recognition on the level of public law as it was through the 1925 Concordat.[50] Such a legal status entails an increasing role in the educational system and in family legislation (concerning divorce, abortion, etc.).

Facing a power both militantly atheistic and theocratic, this ambiguity initially amounted to little except in relation to democratic left critics of the regime. As Michnik shows, this relation improved.[51] While until 1968 the church hierarchy was regarded by the secular left as reactionary, and the latter's opposition to the regime was seen by the church as a family quarrel among its enemies, the battle for human rights in the 1970s has provided a minimum framework of unity. In this context, the church's struggle for legality, free public expression and association — hence for the restoration of civil society — complemented the democratic movement, not to speak of the more immediate protection it afforded members of opposition groups.[52]

The history of relations between the church and state power is also a series of compromises exhibiting several constants:[53] the gradual violation of the terms of the relation by the regimes of Bierut, Gomulka and finally Gierek; the Vatican's pressure from John XXII on, for a more flexible church policy toward the state; the pressure of collaborationist lay Catholic groups (PAX, ODISS) for a compromise on the basis of

49. Cf. A. Michnik, *L'Eglise et la Gauche. Le Dialogue Polonais* (Paris, 1979) and "Was die Polen von dem neuen Papst erwarten" in *Opposition ohne Hoffnung, op.cit.* See also Kolakowski, "Church and Democracy in Poland: Two Views," in *Dissent* (Summer, 1980). See also Kuron's characteristically different stress in seeing the Catholic movement as one among several, in "Pour une Platforme," *op.cit.*, pp. 126-127.

50. Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, "Der Geist des Evangeliums in der Organisation des Gesellschaftlich-beruflichen und des öffentlichen Lebens in Polen," in Dross, ed., *Polen. Freie Gewerkschaften im Kommunismus?* (Hamburg, 1980), p. 114.

51. *L'Eglise et la Gauche, op.cit.*

52. Cf. Rupnik, *op.cit.*, Drawicz, *op.cit.*, and in particular, Michnik, "Was die Polen von dem neuen Papst erwarten," *op.cit.*

53. For this history, see Anna Kaminski, "The Polish Pope and the Polish Catholic Church," in *Survey* (Fall 1979).

the totalitarian status quo; and finally, the staunch resistance of the episcopate to all attempts to change its anti-totalitarian line — its defense of civil society in the broadest possible sense.

As a result, the compromises that worked did so in periods of the regime's weakness and search for new legitimation (after 1956 and 1971). The significance of these compromises must not be underestimated: in the process, a minimum of independent parliamentary representation, a small independent if censored press, and a network of discussion clubs were allowed to emerge. To a great extent, the activities of Catholic representatives, press and clubs prepared the ground for cooperation between the secular democratic opposition and the church. As a result, the whole climate of Polish Catholicism underwent a significant transformation. With the development of a democratic opposition no longer hostile to the church, the political role of Catholic intellectuals also changed. From parliamentary representation seeking reforms of the system from above to advising Solidarity is a long journey. Throughout, however, Catholic intellectuals have insisted that the pressure from outside ruling institutions not be political. While today this may reduce to merely a semantic point, the continuity of language expresses the continuity of something else: the position of Wyszynski and the episcopate.

The church opposes a conflict-oriented struggle even for demands that it supports. The formula "our land should be neither one of disorder nor of political prisoners"[54] captures this, at a time when only the strike weapon can free political prisoners. Concerned with the nation's security but basing himself on Catholic social doctrine, Wyszynski gave an unheeded sermon (August 26) asking for a return to work. The primate and the episcopate clearly supported the August demands, but were ambiguous about the use of the strike weapon.[55] Since then, the church hierarchy has played a cautious, temporizing role. This has resulted in attacks and a general hostility toward KOR.[56] Thus, upon Walesa's return from Rome (January 19, 1981), he announced the termination of KOR's advisory role, which, however, has not been fully carried out. Nevertheless, on March 5 the regime expressed its gratitude to the episcopate for helping stabilize the situation in response to Jaruzelski's plea for three months of labor peace. Finally, at the time of the temporary arrests of Kuron and Michnik as a result of formal government proceedings against KOR, the episcopate again declared (March 13) its opposition to "disorder" — although in the context of supporting the independent union for peasants and agricultural workers.

Given the regime's present weakness, hence its willingness to deal with the church, the following possibilities[57] are open to the episcopate: (1) The acceptance of an unprecedented level of confessional liberty as a price of political passivity — a modern version of the position represented in Poland by the discredited group PAX and elsewhere (e.g., Hungary) by the arrangements accepted by the church. (2) The search for a new authoritarian solution in which Catholicism would somehow become the

54. Quotation from a declaration of the episcopate, March 13, in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 14-15, 1981, p. 5.

55. Compare Wyszynski, "Verantwortung, Pflichten und Rechte im Leben der Nation" and "Kommuniqué des Zentralrats des polnischen Episkopats," both of August 26, 1980, both in *Polen, op.cit.*, pp. 158-159 and pp. 161-163.

56. Father Orszulik, spokesman for the episcopate, had declared that KOR "increases social tensions and angers Poland's neighbors" according to *Der Spiegel*. According to Michnik, he represents only part of the episcopate (cf. "Die Letzte Chance," *op.cit*).

57. These three alternatives are presented by Michnik in "What We Want," *op.cit.*, which reveals a more critical attitude than his book on the same subject.

basis of a new type of ideologically monolithic but now nationally legitimate political order. Here the efforts during the 1970s of the group ODISS seeking an alliance with the nationalist, anti-semitic Moczar wing of the party is significant. (3) Refusing to make a separate deal, the continuation of the battle for a pluralistic solution that would involve a continued separation of church and state, and the defense of other forms of institutional autonomy in society. This is the position of Catholic intellectuals advising Solidarity (Mazoviecki, Cywinski and Wojcicki), as well as related clubs and journals.

Since the church sees itself as the main defender of Polish national identity, the PAX line or any contemporary version of it is clearly unacceptable to the hierarchy because of its different and even compromising stance on the issue of national sovereignty. Also, for the moment, democratic Catholic intellectuals are setting the tone for the church as a whole. Thus, what Michnik called the Iranization of Poland is unlikely. But what happens if adherence to the third alternative is interpreted as increasingly threatening the national economy and sovereignty? A neo-corporatist solution may become relevant. It could be a synthesis of alternatives (2) and (3), i.e., the defense of a form of plurality where conflict is avoided on the basis of national considerations by means of a set of compulsory compromises in which major (and therefore bureaucratic) social organizations alone participate.

The structure of the Polish church as well as its relation to civil society predispose it to an authoritarian solution — as long as such a solution is not anti-national or, of course, anti-Catholic. This is often disregarded by the democratic opposition because of its desire to preserve its new alliance with the church. Is the church an "unyielding repository of traditional libertarian values" or is it interested primarily in defending its own particular interests since its internal record on civil rights is rather dismal?[58] Does it condemn militance from below only because of its fear of Soviet intervention, or also because of its own conception of social order? Would the church, as Gross implies, be willing to suspend its support for the democratic movement in return for significant privileges? While today the church is "the strongest and weakest link in the coalition of liberalizing forces...the only partner able to enter into a separate peace with the regime," its hierarchy does not alone represent Polish Catholicism and Catholic intellectuals in the democratic movement. This should not make "the secular left" forget that according to Cywinski, the Polish church hierarchy, once that of a Constantinian church (state church) today represents a Julian church (the temporarily disestablished and persecuted church under Emperor Julian the Apostate).[59] In intransigent opposition to state persecution, it waits to be restored not in its economic and political privileges but as the established moral authority in the life of the nation. Hence its solidarity with society is conditional. The church's renunciation of its Julianism, i.e., solidarity with the independent social efforts, has so far occurred in the framework of a defensive tactic of unification of all opposition in order to restore civil society. But what holds for a defensive tactic may not hold for an offensive one when legitimate state authority is in shambles.

For the moment, the church could test its inclinations toward a neo-corporatist

58. For some of this record, see Hans-Hermann Hücking and Marek Tadeusz Swiecicki, "Die laizistische Linke — ein Verbündeter für die Kirche?" in Sozialistisches Osteuropakomitee, *Polen 1980* (Hannover, 1981), pp. 81-84.

59. Cf. A. Michnik, *L'Eglise et la Gauche, op.cit.*, pp. 114ff. But even Michnik does not always pay sufficient attention to the arguments he reproduces from Cywinski's *Généalogies des insoumis,* perhaps for tactical reasons.

compromise with the third potential partner for such a solution: the independent union. So far, combined government and church pressure to separate Solidarity from the democratic opposition seems to have failed. Today Solidarity is organizationally quite different from the church and the ruling party: it is a mix of syndicalist and pluralist structures. Thus, successful pressures on its leadership run into resistance on the part of the participating rank and file. Only a bureaucratic hierarchical restructuring, with state and-or church influence on the selection of the leadership could make it a viable neo-corporatist power. To their credit, the Catholic intellectuals advising Solidarity have emphasized,[60] along with KOR, the struggle against bureaucratization. The unions' refusal to take on management functions is part of this struggle for an independent, democratic organization whose leadership is not institutionally separated from its membership — hence a model of a different version of civil society than the church's. Will the church learn to accept this model or, better, that of a pluralist civil society capable of accommodating different types of institutions of interest intermediation? While today Solidarity is under pressures, so is the church.

While the church's answer to the question of social alternatives depends on several agents of which the hierarchy is only one, the party-state's needs with respect to the church can be extrapolated from the dynamics of the present crisis. In the midst of a deep legitimation crisis, the regime does not have sufficient loyalty to impose an autonomous authoritarian solution. It also lacks the popular support needed to reform the economy that would require restraining both consumption and conflict.[61] Given the uselessness of Marxism-Leninism, or of technocratic reformist ideology, the key to any policy not relying on Russian military intervention is the reactivation of the third component of that ideological grab-bag employed by all authoritarian socialist ruling parties: nationalism. The re-emergence of Moczar, the appointment of Jaruzelski as prime minister, the convergence of anti-semitic slogans of the Moczar people and of the far right KPN opposition (vigorously repudiated by Solidarity) point in this direction. But in Poland it is the church that holds the keys to the nation. Clearly, it is inclined to give the regime a chance to revitalize the economy and preserve national sovereignty: hence its support for the call of no strikes for three months after Jaruzelski's taking office. But the regime will have to start doing something with this opportunity other than merely repressing dissidents. Unlike in the Soviet Union,[62] nationalist legitimation in Poland may not be an alternative to economic reforms, but only its complement or result.

Socialist Civil Society?

In spite of having had some of the foremost market socialist theoreticians (Lange, Lakecki, Brus and Lipinski), and two periods of intense discussions concerning economic reforms (after 1956 and 1971), Poland has not undergone any sustained decentralization when compared to, for example, Hungary. While the hardening of the ruling parties against reforms after 1968 was a general Eastern European phenomenon, the Polish solution to avoid reforms was unique. Given the existing

60. Cf. T. Mazoviecki, "Les tâches de Solidarité," in *L'Alternative* (January-February 1981).

61. The opposition suggests that full democratization in the spirit of August 31 could provide the regime with the credibility needed to undertake economic reforms. This solution, however, is the greatest threat to the system's organizational principle since it implies dual power. Only under constraint, and if the regime has no better alternative, will this be accepted.

62. Cf. V. Zaslavsky, "Why Afghanistan?" *Telos* 43 (Spring 1980), pp. 139-141; and C. Castoriadis, "Facing the War," *Telos* 46 (Winter 1980-81), pp. 43-61.

overcentralized structure, it resulted in massive indebtedness to the West leading first to a dramatic upturn, and then to disaster. After the events of 1980, everyone in Poland today is speaking of economic reforms.[63] Serious economic reforms in Eastern European countries, however, are never determined by economic considerations. The reasons why these economies have not been decentralized are not because of fear of adverse economic consequences nor because of the dogmatic belief of the ruling party in its ridiculous doctrines. Up to now, no fool-proof method has been found for the combination of a largely destatized economy and the preservation of the ruling institution. Yet, the crisis of planning rationality has intensified. Thus, in principle, economic reforms remain on the agenda, while alternative forms of crisis management dominate.

Economic reforms in Eastern Europe can be seen as part of the transition since Stalin's death from positive subordination of all social spheres to the party-state, to negative subordination — a lower level of penetration, preserving the functional primacy of the party-state. Most analysts are right to concentrate on the economy (where the transition is from extensive to intensive development) not because this transformation necessarily brings about a general liberalization but because of the opposite: economic decentralization of authoritarian state socialism is possible (e.g., Yugoslavia), leaving the system's organizational principle intact. As in the Yugoslav example, however, having withdrawn from the centralized management, the party-state must seek its legitimacy elsewhere than in "rational redistribution" and "substantive material justice." Secondly, the ruling party must preserve its functional primacy in social organization, culture as well as state administration in order to fulfill the "leading role of the party." Finally, in such a situation, economic reforms are not initiated from above unless the party-state's relation to the economy can be separated from the rest of society. The legal conditions of a decentralized economy alone cannot be allowed to develop into a full-fledged system of private law without endangering the real basis of the leading role of the party: its power of arbitrary intervention.

The difficulty in satisfying these three conditions explains the oscillation between partial decentralization and recentralization in all Eastern European societies. In Poland the first two conditions have been absent. Thus, attempts at reform always came (or were feigned) in the wake of popular risings. A charitable interpretation of Gierek's economic manipulations is that he hoped to achieve the necessary legitimation for reforms through a prior dramatic improvement in the standard of living. If so, the timing was totally wrong. At any rate, today in Poland all the conditions necessary for economic reforms from above are absent. Does this mean the impossibility of significant economic reforms because of the "leading role of the party"?

In Poland today structural reforms from below have altered the conditions for economic decentralization. The leading role of the party *vis-à-vis* social organization and culture has been greatly diminished. As a result, both reforms and non-reforms

63. There seem to be at least four proposals around, of which three are from government related agencies and close to Brus' market socialist *cum* workers' control formula of the 1960s, while the other focuses on the shift of priorities to consumption in general and agriculture in particular. There are also the expected differences between the two types of proposals in terms of who is to formulate reforms: the government (and Sejm) or the union and its experts along with the government. Cf. "Vorschläge für eine neue Wirtschaftspolitik" in "Polen 1980," *op.cit.*, pp. 63ff. The major difference among the proposals is timing. Solidarity wants the whole package including workers' control from the beginning to avoid the bitter experience of post-1956 and post-1971 reform proposals.

have apparently become impossible. After long hesitation, the party may ultimately reject economic decentralization since today the primacy of the party-state over society is limited to economic planning and management. Any retreat there may precipitate a serious identity crisis within the party — possibly an internal split reminiscent of 1956 and 1968, to be followed by Soviet intervention. The leading role of the party would be practically meaningless if the state gave up its economic functions.

Yet, to avoid economic reform would also be a disaster. How can an already bankrupt economic system plagued by elementary shortages (the socialist version of inflation) survive the fact that its most powerful economic agent is an independent labor union that cannot in the long run avoid battling for the standard of living of its members, i.e., their real wages? Aside from all the reasons for the system's decentralization,[64] independent unions require independent management to resolve local demands according to local interests. With the state as the ultimate manager, local management, far weaker than the associated unions, either gives in since it does not foot the bill alone, or it defers to the state, causing every economic conflict to become immediately a political one. In the present centralized context, even temporary workers' self-restraint only postpones the day of reckoning. Efforts to increase productivity yield very little given the conditions of capital utilization in such economies.[65] Thus, the system cannot solve its economic crisis without significant decentralization.

It is absurd to speculate about possible ways out of this dilemma, but it is also irresponsible simply to paint a hopeless picture. The way out may be the acceptance of economic reforms as the system's crisis management. The economy must be decentralized, notwithstanding its consequences. This means the autonomy of branches, the gradual elimination of unproductive units, a high degree of market determination of most, if not all, prices, a shift of priorities in favor of demand, i.e., consumer goods sector and agriculture, horizontal links among units, etc. For such a policy to be instituted, unions must give it breathing space by restraining economic demands. The lesson of 1980 is that such self-restraint can be converted into political demands. The next foreseeable period should be one of syndicalist organization building rather than pluralist interest conflict. One of the results of this could be worker self-management of industry and institutional arrangements whereby societal associations negotiate with the state concerning economic plans. This is because, in order to satisfy the conditions imposed by the party-state's political collapse, the economy would have to remain a planned state socialist one in the sense of the economic reformers of the 1960s.[66] In other words, it is not enough for the opposition to prevent the party-state from falling apart — as Kuron ironically suggested; it must also be left with something to do. Within the context of dual power as *de facto* established in Poland, it is in the economic sphere that the power and self-identity of the existing system must be preserved. This is possible only through the continuation of macro-economic planning. Is this concession purely tactical? This question can be tackled by raising two others: is a socialist civil society desirable and possible? And what is the road to it in Poland?

Following Szelenyi's suggestion,[67] it is possible to go beyond Kolakowski's position

64. Cf. Wlodzimierz Brus, *The Economics and Politics of Socialism* (London, 1973), for some of the best summaries.

65. Marc Rakovski, *Towards an East European Marxism, op.cit.* See also Antonio Carlo, "The Crisis of Bureaucratic Collectivism," in *Telos* 43 (Spring 1980), pp. 3-32.

66. Cf. Brus, *op.cit.*, pp. 35ff.

67. "Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe: Dilemmas and Prospects" in *Opposition in*

whereby efforts to establish the state and civil society duality necessarily lead to authoritarianism, and maintain that a socialist civil society would be a more consistent realization of the goals of 18th century democratic revolutions than contemporary bourgeois-capitalist civil society. Unfortunately, without historical examples to rely on, literature concerning a socialist civil society is necessarily sparse. Such a future literature needs to explore the possibilities of: (1) the non-identity between private law and private property; (2) market without capital formation, and planning without authoritarianism; (3) plurality without corporatism — indeed, syndicalist plurality of self-managing entities; (4) critical publics in a world of mass communications; (5) a structure of political compromise among particular, independent units that encompasses the universal; (6) the reduction of political and economic bureaucracy to purely technical, administrative functions under the control of democratic assemblies; and (7) a fruitful combination of direct and parliamentary democracy.

Some of these, of course, were the concerns of early modern political theory, while some are more modern. Are they hopelessly irrelevant? This paper has sought to show the possibility of points (3), (4), and (5); reject point (7), while acknowledging point (6) as one of the givens of the Polish situation. A socialist civil society cannot be established in today's Poland. But, barring Soviet intervention, is what in formation a socialist version of civil society? Previous arguments here established only the possibility of the emergence of a radically democratic model of society.

The part of the Polish opposition that describes itself as democratic socialist, i.e., KOR and the Solidarity leadership, has repeatedly described its goals as compatible with socialism. This, however, has meant only unwillingness to restore former owners or to abolish the social welfare system. To this Walesa adds only: "Socialism is a good road. But it should be a Polish road." KOR does not say much more. Even the need to combine parliamentary democracy (that need not be incompatible with public ownership) with direct democracy is stressed only by Kuron, though workers' interest in autonomous self-management is clear enough. Yet, even this amounts "only" to radical democracy.

The restoration of capitalism was and remains unacceptable to explain the development of Eastern European societies, whose new organizational principle is authoritarian state socialism. The same may not be true for the institutionalization of yet another "contradictory" model of civil society in the hypothetical situation that this organizational principle were abolished — or even in case the consolidation of dual power resulted in a destatized economy composed of self-managing units horizontally related through a self-regulating market.[68] Though industrial democracy is incompatible with Western capitalism, is it in principle incompatible with the emergence of new forms of dependence and inequality? The question is serious, given the power of the world capitalist economy to which Poland now in part belongs. Free of the threat of external intervention, in Poland it would be the task of workers' parties as well as other groupings in a freely elected Sejm to preserve socialism, including projects of equalization.

Eastern Europe, op.cit., pp. 200ff.

68. For a different formulation of the problem that stresses socialism as self-managing society (what I called radical democracy), see Ferenc Feher, "Eastern Europe in the '80s," *Telos* 45 (Fall 1980), p. 17. But I wonder if socialism, however redefined, may also have to mean the protection of at least some sphere of life through macro-planning. This cannot be the result of radical democracy in the cells of society which represent particular sectoral interests. This allows for the role of planning, supervised by parliamentary compromise, in achieving the universal dimensions of socialism in what could be future democratic socialist systems. This also makes possible a legitimate role for the surviving elements of the *Planstaat* under the next, more democratic stage of state socialism emerging in Poland.

But today this Poland is impossible. And yet universality, which never emerges spontaneously from plurality, must somehow be represented. The state part of the ruling institution, separated out as an administrative and planning bureaucracy, could assume this function: the representation of the need to preserve and develop the welfare state features of the system. The exclusion of some domains from market principles, the protection of unproductive yet culturally and socially significant enterprises, the prevention of some capital accumulation through laws, the representation of the whole in foreign trade, and indicative, macro-planning of growth, investment, etc., would allow a state to remain the leading force. These are all redistributive functions in the Western sense of redressing inequalities rather than in the Eastern sense of engendering new ones.[69] Of course, the difference could not be left up to the party: the social plans worked out by experts to fulfill these tasks of redistribution could be represented in negotiations in which the party would be only one of the partners, and the others would also be able to rely on experts and present counter-plans. The arrangement would preserve the party's identity as the leading force in the building of socialism, even if it would mean an entirely unprecedented stage of state socialist development.

All of this is highly unrealistic, since the independent union has not proposed anything along these lines. Although it has insisted on participation in the ratification of plans presented by the state on the basis of proposals worked out by its own experts working with its "research institute," Solidarity has made few specific demands relating to structural economic reforms. While its unwillingness to accept unemployment and price rises resulting from rationalization and decentralization blocks the union's acceptance of most readily available reform strategies, its reticence is motivated by something even more fundamental. It would be difficult to preserve the independence of the social sphere if the leading social institution assumed responsibility for state proposals which will necessarily be biased against some social interests — including some of the workers' interests. The institutions of Polish society cannot accept responsibility for present dysfunctions or for the dysfunctions that will inevitably arise from attempts to reform it.

This is strengthened by Solidarity's formal unwillingness to directly participate in governmental reform discussions (though, of course, individuals associated with the union have worked out proposals and even attended as observers discussions of various government task forces). Having restored social organization and, to a lesser extent, culture to civil society, a relative primacy over the economy is left by omission to the state as the token of its continuing social function, as well as the basis of the party's continuing social identity. It can be hoped that the resulting policy will not issue in disaster.[70]

In other Eastern European countries under Soviet rule, even economic reforms from above halt before the specter of civil society. Since civil society has been reconstituted from below, even economic reforms are now possible in Poland. Thus, the Polish democratic movement has placed the program of a socialist civil society, suspended as a result of 1968, back on the agenda of Eastern European alternatives.

69. See Szelenyi, "Social Inequalities in State Socialist Redistributive Economies," in *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (Spring-Summer 1978).

70. For any sensible policy to emerge, leading forces in the party must realize that the provocations by some of the apparatus and security forces threaten national disaster. Maybe the leadership fears a potentially democratizing movement at the coming extraordinary congress of the party rank and file far more than its conservative elements. Paradoxically, the opposition may be best off with a fundamentally unchanged party that, however, fully honors the Gdansk accords.